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On the cover, a classic representation of the ‘Vinegar Tasters’ is shown. The three men represent Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Daoism founders who just tasted the ‘essence of life’ after dipping their fingers in the pot. 
Confucius makes a sour face; his intent is to think of ways to make life taste better. Buddha makes a bitter face 
while observing his thoughts and emotions on the taste. For Lao Zi, it tastes ‘sweet’ because he accepts the taste 
of vinegar as it is. Critics argue that the painting favors Daoism due to this insinuated superiority. However, in 
Chinese philosophy, Daoism is not favored but put in synthesis with the other two traditions. Lao Zi is not 
smiling because the essence of life is ‘tasty’, but he is experientially learning the essence of life being ‘tasty’ as 
is. Therefore, interpreting the smile as sweet and superior is a misunderstanding judgement disregarding the 
Daoist observation of vinegar’s Being. Source picture: http://www.edepot.com/graphics/vinegartastersgold.jpg 
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Chapter 65 – Dao De Jing1 
 
In the old days, those who were adept in the Tao, 
did not use it to make people clever, 
but to keep them silly. 
If the people have too many ideas, it will be difficult to control. 
 
Truly: to control a country through ideas, is  
robbing the land; 
to leave that, the land prospers. 
 
Those who are always aware of this opposition take 
her also as a yardstick. 
Always being able to apply the correct standard, 
that means possessing the inscrutable inner strength. 
That dark inner strength, how deep it is not, and how 
far-reaching he is! 
He takes things onto the road of return, 
to allow them to go along with the large throughput. 
(Schipper, 2010, p.153)   
                                              
1 Translated by Schipper from Chinese to Dutch. This chapter has been heavily criticized by scholars due to its 
insinuation of ‘keeping people ignorant’. Within its context, this text actually concludes a call for humans to be 
in harmony with the Dao (Way) and their inner strength De (a moving force from within themselves that comes 
forth from Dao). Chapter 65 calls for a more humane civilization that respects the laws of nature, not just laws 
born out of human techné (Schipper, 2010, p.152) because human techné leads to cultured craftiness, ruse and 
deceit (De Voigt, 2011, p.247). This is what the author, Lao Zi, of the Dao De Jing means with ‘too many ideas 
makes it too difficult to control’. The meaning of chapter 65 is that in Heideggerian words humans should live 
with the existence of a Being of nature instead of defining nature as an instrument to Mankind. I chose this 
chapter due to the hyper moral belittling misunderstanding by Confucian and other – anthropocentric – critics. 
They have used this chapter to blackguard Daoism, while the chapter is a critical perspective on human act. 
Consequences of mass hyper moral behavior are seen as well towards German philosophers Martin Heidegger, 
Peter Sloterdijk and Meister Eckhart in their attempts to think through what humanity beholds. I find this 
behavior dogmatic in anthropocentric thinking and that it sabotages critical and reflective thinking. Insofar, I 
implicate that hyper moral behavior, as a consequence of anthropocentrism, sabotaged self-critical thinking in 
humanism in the past and will continue to so in the Anthropocene debate.   
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Introduction 
During my study at the University for Humanistic Studies (UvH) in The Netherlands; I found 
one thing very peculiar. There were seldom humanistic insights from Asian philosophies or 
religions in my curriculum. Did this insinuate that Asians do not know or have humanism? 
What about the confrontational dialogues between the - very humanist - Confucianism and 
nature-based Daoism? Could we compare it with Jan van Praag’s Dutch modern humanism 
versus nihilism? Why do we ‘have to’ make meaning of our lives? Why do we ‘regret’ if we 
have missed opportunities in life? Why do we have to ‘become’ something and not just ‘be’? 
I considered myself a Dutch modern humanist, but also as a Chinese Dutchman with 
Chinese parents, raised in the Netherlands with Chinese culture and philosophies such as 
Daoism, Confucianism and Buddhism and raised in Dutch society with Dutch culture and 
philosophies like Christianity and secular humanism. As the UvH-curriculum honed my 
reflective skills, I saw conflicts and untaught similarities, among these philosophical and 
cultural differences. Some reflections started to become unbearably hypocrite in my own 
identity and philosophical thought, but to ignore my Chinese roots with a Dutch-German 
philosophy of vice versa was simply not possible nor something I wished for. Thus became a 
self-urged distress to understand and reconcile my identity at the UvH, while studying – and 
practicing - Chinese martial arts, Traditional Chinese Medicine and Chinese philosophy 
privately. Inevitably, critical questions on humanism – and Chinese culture - were bred, like: 
we call our humanism inclusive, but just how inclusive is it really? We call humanism 
dynamic, but is this not with a narrowed idealism? Why do ‘useful’ things, scientific findings 
and philosophical concepts need ‘to be made and become’ humanist? We fancy to cut and fit 
humanity-enhancing concepts of other life philosophies into our own. But if it does not fit, 
we call it a philosophical movement of humanism. Is this not imperialistically arrogant? 
Thus, dare I say that in these humanist patterns, there is a dogmatic behavior that we do not 
and let not be criticized?  
An ability to self-criticize our normative culture is what I consider one of the most 
valued virtues of humanism. And it is due to this virtue that I have found a safe space to 
overthink and philosophize with others at the UvH on thinking beyond the ‘me, myself and 
I’. One of these humanist lessons is that beyond the ‘me’, there is the ‘other’, but the 
difficulty of understanding the other is that we are not gifted with the knowledge and 
experiences of the other. So, we are condemned to hermeneutically view the other’s 
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perspective from our frames of references. But what about empathy, the ability of feeling the 
situation of the other? It is necessary to have experienced the similar or same kind of feelings 
and situations to be able to empathize. Imagining the other’s situation is subject to your own 
normativity, emotions and feelings that could only hope to guess the feelings of the ‘other’. 
Therefore, self-critical thinking to see through your subjectivism of the other’s situation and 
understanding the reality of the ‘other’ is necessary to think beyond the ‘me’ and to transcend 
your own normative culture. And yet, all of this stays relatively limited to yours and the 
other’s thinking. 
This is why I do not believe in a one-size-fits-all philosophy. I think a single 
philosophy is not capable, no matter how dynamic and broad, to contemplate the fullness of 
human beings and their world. I do believe that we can get ever-closer to elastic core 
principles of what we like humans to be, think what humans are and want what humans 
should become. By knowing that for every ‘me’ is an ‘other’ to another, we are be able to 
share experiences, feelings and thoughts. We are able to self-criticize our behaviors from our 
own reality and relate to the other’s reality or perspective. This is also why I do not find it a 
good cause to instrumentalize and commercialize spiritual practices such as meditation and 
yoga in deconstructed and instrumentalized forms of medical-scientifically legitimized 
quantifiable, and only therefore, ‘useful’ mindfulness. In Eastern philosophies, traditional 
spiritual practices do not fix ‘mindless’ problems in ten sessions. They are considered life-
long instrumental practices to help become more spiritual, to help be more in tune with a 
reality beyond humans, but not as solutions to problems. To be and feel connected, if not 
transcendentally with other beings is a mode of relating. Yet, in the western world, these 
mindfulness practices are mainly considered useful because they are medical-scientifically 
proven. Not to become more fully human and as a way to place yourself in a reality, but as 
solutions to western problems of ‘thoughtless minds’ and ‘stress reductions’ using proof of 
the enlargement of the neocortex (the brain area for self-reflection) and lowered blood values 
of stress hormones. Herein lies the danger of framing scientific results as ideologic 
interpretable data for an ‘ethically’ enhanced self-ego that distances itself from others who do 
not do these spiritual practices. In other words, deconstructed quantifiable results from these 
spiritual practices are expected, projected and legitimized as reasons for people to exalt 
themselves instead of learning to feel connected to others. Thus, these spiritual practices are 
instrumentalized for self-ego enhancement instead of being used for spiritual means. Recent 
results from a study at the University of Amsterdam on the enhancement of empathy by brief 
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five-minute mindfulness meditation exercises (Ridderinkhof, De Bruin, Brummelman, & 
Bögels, 2017) did not show improvement in empathy in people with high levels of autistic or 
narcissistic traits. “The mindfulness exercise even decreased empathy among narcissistic 
individuals.” (ibid, p.264). Gebauer et al. (2018) examined the contradiction of the ego-
quieting hypothesis of yoga and meditation with the psychological universal self-centrality 
principle (SCP). The SCP-principle, first formulated by philosopher and psychologist 
William James (1907), renders any skill-practice self-central and the principle states that self-
centrality breeds self-enhancement. The experiments by Gebauer et al. (2018) concluded that 
the SCP-principle applies to yoga and meditation as well; meaning that mind-body practices 
actually exalts the self and boosts agentic narcissism. Part of their methods based expertise on 
the years of practice and actual knowledge of the meditation concepts. But what if the 
participants have been following commercialized Yoga or meditation classes, for a long time, 
to exalt themselves? Would this frame not let the SCP-principle win by default? Should we 
interpret these results as ‘body-mind practices boost narcissism’ or as a frame in which the 
specific results did not find the quieting-ego principle the traditions teach? In another 2018 
study, Kreplin, Farias & Brazil have shown that meditation is likely to have a positive but 
relatively limited effect in making “individuals feel or act in a substantially more socially 
connected, or less aggressive and prejudiced way” (p.8). This prosociality as they call it, may 
not be cultivated through meditation itself, but to the bias, beliefs and expectations of the 
meditation teacher and participants. From these results, an interpretation can be made that 
their examined meditation methods enhance prosociality in a zero-to-limited way. But what 
is not considered is that the ‘theoretical mist’ and ‘moral beliefs and bias’ from the religious 
traditions the practices were taken are essential elements or frames in which the meditation is 
performed. This dissonance in understanding spiritual practices, from an analytical 
perspective and not from an associative perspective as hinted by the last study, is an example 
of what I mean by viewing things from an ‘instrumental’ perspective and judging them by 
this instrumental framed value. 
It would be true that analytical thinking is the greatest western contribution to Eastern 
spiritual practices, if not the ‘un-useful’ spirituality is stripped of its ‘meaning-fullness’ by the 
chosen frames of the analytic methodology. In other words, western analytical thought 
decides what is useful and whatnot, disregarding the value put on meaning-fullness in those 
spiritual practices by Eastern thought. Traditional Eastern thought has absorbed Western 
cognitive rational thinking as a means to extract and mold philosophies from their mystic 
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religions and traditions. Some examples are works of Zen-Buddhism Master Eihei Dōgen 
(1200-1253 CE) and Buddhist philosopher Daisaku Ikeda (1928- CE) who have contributed 
greatly in making Buddhism understandable for the Western world. But a mutual 
understanding of Western and Eastern humanity-seeking has not been met in their respective 
philosophical discourses. The spiritual practices are kept within the Western and Eastern 
discourses they are subject to, even though every ‘me’ and ‘other’ considers the spiritual 
practices as helpful for a better humanity.  
Extrapolating this insight to the Anthropocene debate, I will make a daring 
implication that professor and humanist philosopher Harry Kunneman (2017) did not fully 
awaken from anthropocentrism as he claimed to be. From a Daoist perspective, he is right to 
call humanity a life principle that precedes humanness. But to call this principle ‘humanity’ is 
anthropocentric in itself. I wish to say that his ‘new’ insight is revolutionary for humanism, 
but how revolutionary is it really if humanists live in their own metaphysical world? This is 
not to demean a professor whom I utmost respect or to smudge Enlightment values I greatly 
hold dear. What I try to implicate is that this insight is not a semantic issue on the word 
‘humanity’, but that it is a fundamental dogmatic humanist way of thought that holds dangers 
of ignorant arrogance and narcissism. Humanists see no other world than one perceived with 
human powers and capabilities, through human eyes and with humanized values. It shackles 
humanists in a thinking that the entire world is the human world. A reality in which humanity 
is the same as humanness and that humans are in a supraposition compared to other life forms 
and its environment. The parallel confrontation between Daoism and Confucianism taught 
that the world is bigger than humans themselves. But for modern humanism, I wonder if we 
have a counterpart who can criticize its exalted ego. And so, I wish to re-iterate this critical 
insight to other humanists. By understanding and dialogizing with another’s philosophy, we 
may actually gain better understanding and reflection on our own humanity and humanness. 
In parallel, Daoism, Buddhism and Confucianism have been in philosophical discussion with 
each other since 350 BC. These interlocutions produced wonderful insights on the human 
mind, its position in the world and the relativity of humanity and humanness. My bet is that 
Eastern philosophies, due to their interlocutions and philosophical discourse of relating to 
nature instead of the Western philosophical discourse of relating to the other human, have 
gained insights that could enhance our humanity-concept in the Western philosophical 
tradition by addressing the issues of anthropocentrism. Their insights may help to 
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fundamentally criticize the – humanist - notion that humans live in their own meaning-given 
and self-centered world.  
Humanists should not stop self-criticizing themselves; it is a great virtue to be able to 
reflect. Neither should they stop criticizing others, as it is a great virtue to be free to think, but 
humanism does need to realize that it has hypocrite and hyper moral tendencies. Historically 
seen, it is an undeniable fact that the main philosophical discourse in humanism is an 
anthropocentrism with the human as an animal rationale (the rational-analytical thinking 
animal), one that has condemned nearly all other non-metaphysical western philosophies and 
has blackguarded philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche2, Martin Heidegger 3 and Peter 
Sloterdijk4 who dared to point at humanism’s mistakes. I must conclude that whenever 
humanism feels threatened, it bares hyper moral fangs. Whenever humanists do not see 
criticism on humanity (or humanitas) and humanization as constructive criticism, that is when 
they demonize the others as immoral, as failure, as unuseful, as danger. It begs a question that 
puts a mirror in front of humanists in the debate on the Anthropocene: “can we only live in a 
fully human-defined Anthropocene world or are we unwilling to horizontalize our 
relationships with other beings in a pre-metaphysical world?” By writing this thesis, I hope to 
implore humanists to self-criticize our humanity, humanness and humanism beyond our own 
frames. I implore us to understand, listen to and discuss with each other, in the effort of 
finding core principles of humanness and humanity. I implore us to see the benefits of one 
another’s insights not only as useful, but also as meaning-full. I think this is the way to find 
out what it means to be human. Not by self-definition, but by observation. 
I want to thank my mentor Dr. Martien Schreurs wholeheartedly in supporting my 
years-long journey with his positive enthusiasm. I also want to thank Dr. Wike Seekles for 
her patience and altruistic mindset. And lastly, I want to thank my girlfriend Jennifer for her 
absolute support.  
  
                                              
2 nihilism and thought on nature 
3 ridiculed by scholars on his thought of proposing humans as ‘shepherds of Being’ and on antimetaphysics 
4 lynching by Jürgen Habermas on Sloterdijk’s assumed human breeding program  
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1.1 Inducement and motivation 
In the current debate on the Anthropocene, most humans are increasingly convinced that their 
current behavior with Earth’s resources is unsustainable. The Anthropocene, coined by a 
Nobel prize-winning scientist Paul Crutzen, is an era in which Man has a lasting effect on the 
environment. Although the term ‘Anthropocene’ is not official yet, as it does not meet 
geology requirements, it is being taken over by several scientific research fields: climate 
sciences, biology, ecology and human sciences to discuss the negative impact of the 
anthropos (human) on the planet says humanist philosopher Wouter Achterberg (1994, p.20). 
In human sciences, it points to a doubt of what Man was, is and to be (ibid, p.20). This 
philosophical reflection and the consequence of the Anthropocene has led to a fiery debate on 
anthropocentrism.5 Anthropocentrism holds the definition of centering humans in the 
universe as the only object with intrinsic value, the only being that consciously values and all 
other things are subject to the needs, wants and wishes humans have (Achterberg, 1994, p.4). 
So, anthropocentrism is the philosophical reflection and consequence of the debate on the 
Anthropocene. Dutch humanist philosophers such as Henk Manschot, Wouter Achterberg, 
Hans Achterhuis and Harry Kunneman have made attempts to reconcile Mankind with nature 
by addressing the philosophical discussion on humanism’s anthropocentrism (Achterberg, 
1994; Achterhuis, 1990; Kunneman, 2017; Manschot, 2010). All of them attempt to place 
intrinsic value beyond the sphere of Mankind, so that not only Mankind but also other 
animals and plants have intrinsic value. By making other beings valuable, they should gain 
protectable ethical interest. However, I find that their argumentation mostly motivate 
ecocentrism through the interests of the Anthropos (human). For example, intrinsic value is to 
be given to animals and plants because it cannot only be humans who have intrinsic value 
(Kunneman, 2017). But this ‘equal parties’-logic means that humans – already - have 
intrinsic value, while ecosystems, animals and plants need to gain and be approved of 
intrinsic value by humans’ sensibility and receptivity of values (Achterberg, 1992). Thus the 
origin of this advancement in ecocentric thought is actually anthropocentrically motivated. 
This implicates that the previous argumentation does not fully transcend anthropocentrism. 
Humanism needs to transcend anthropocentrism to horizontalize the power relations it has 
                                              
5 Early sources mentioned by humanist philosopher Wouter Achterberg such as humanisme en filosofie 
[humanism and philosophy] in Rekenschap, 37 (1990), nr.4; P. Cliteur, Humanistische Filosofie [Humanist 
philosophy], Kok Agora Kampen, 1990; P. Cliteur & W. van Dooren (red.), Geschiedenis van het humanisme 
[History of humanism], Boom Meppel/Amsterdam 1991.  
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with other life forms, but is currently unable to do so due to its focus on the submission of 
nature for humans (Kunneman, 2017). Therefore, we may need to reflect fundamentally on 
the position of humanism on anthropocentrism. Is humanism, and Mankind, actually able to 
disposition itself from its superposition among other life forms?  
High-profiled philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund 
Freud, Martin Heidegger and Theodor Adorno have taken part in criticizing the capabilities 
of humanity to understand the world. In the 1960-1970’s, there are other humanism critics 
such as Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard and a younger 
group with names as Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Alain Badiou, Giorgio 
Agamben, Slavoj Zizek en Peter Sloterdijk. Overall, these critics point out two problems with 
anthropocentrism: 1. ‘only humans are considered of moral value and the non-human nature 
is not, 2. science and techné will subdue the non-human nature into instrumental values’ 
(Davidson, n.d.). But next to his inspirator, the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Martin Heidegger has been influential on the critique on humanism due to his attempts on 
transcending metaphysics. An increasing amount of scholars are convinced that Heidegger’s 
Being and Time (1999) and his overall criticism on humanism has been strongly influenced 
by Eastern thought, in particular Daoism (Stambaugh in Parkes, 1990; Pöggeler in Parkes, 
1990; Lee, 2001; Froese, 2006), and more concretely his ontological and metaphysical 
reflections (Delaune, 2015; Sorajjakool, 2001; Vlieger, 2014). This implicates that the 
criticizing train of thought on anthropocentrism might not have started with Heidegger and 
Nietzsche, but with Eastern thought as well.  
Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophies are immensely popular in Eastern countries 
like Japan and China due to their anti-rationalism and resonance with Zen Buddhism (Froese, 
2006, p.5). However, in the Dutch Humanistic Canon (humanistischecanon.nl), no Eastern 
authors nor thinkers are mentioned. This is mostly due to the inability of understanding and 
accepting traditional Eastern thought and religions in metaphysical and cognitive-rational 
frames like western philosophical traditions have been, says Belgian philosopher Patricia de 
Martelaere (2006). Until the 17th century, metaphysics has been considered a main theme for 
western rationalists due to their wish to understand the core principles of reality. But Eastern 
thinkers were mostly interested in living a healthy and harmonious life in accordance with the 
laws of nature. It is this difference in the approach to truth why spirituality - and critique on 
anthropocentrism - , in the sense of relativizing a reality, in Eastern philosophy has been 
more readily accepted than in Western philosophy (Schipper 2010; De Martelaere, 2006). 
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Simply said, rationalist Western philosophers were more eager to deconstruct and analyze the 
human being and his reality, instead of making sense of spirituality. Eastern ‘philosophers’ 
assumed the sensed world as is and related to it. This has simplistically resulted in two total 
different philosophical discourses of the West and the East. The West that created a meaning-
given metaphysical world and the East that related to a ‘sensed’ world. 
Martin Heidegger may very well be the only well-known historical philosopher in the 
entire Western philosophical tradition who has understood traditional Eastern thought, in 
particular Daoism and Zen-Buddhism (Delaune, 2005; Froese, 2006; Hsiao, 1987). In Meister 
Eckhart’s mysticism, Heidegger finds the term gelassenheit that helps him to let –human - 
Being emerge. Eastern thought catalyzed this anti-metaphysical and anti-rational exploration 
in his critique on humanism (1990). If Heidegger’s thought on Being (Sein) has been strongly 
influenced by Eastern thought, then we should assume that his critique on humanism and 
anthropocentrism6 has been influenced by Eastern thought. This makes it peculiar that 
Heidegger’s philosophy is considered core literature on the critique on humanism, but 
traditional Eastern thought is not. Would it not be fair to explore this influential source of his 
thinking? Although the historical contexts of Eckhart, Heidegger, modern humanism, 
Chinese and Eastern thought completely differ from each other; I think we can find relational 
essences among these traditions and philosophies. I am not looking for philosophical 
comparisons, but for a ‘sensed’ criticism among these philosophies on Mankind’s 
anthropocentrism by rethinking what human Being (Dasein) or human Tao is. The essence of 
this criticism may be able to contemplate blind spots of Western wisdom-seeking and be 
extrapolated as an insight in the debate on the Anthropocene and anthropocentrism.  
It is not a new thought to criticize anthropocentrism. Neither is it a new thought to 
compare Western philosophy with traditional Eastern thought7.  Or even to acknowledge that 
Heidegger was strongly influenced by Daoism, even though the Humanistic Canon does not 
mention this critical link. But, in the critique on anthropocentrism, I found a direct source 
from a totally different philosophical discourse that suggests current humanism’s thought on 
horizontalizing power relations with other beings is not being radical enough and that 
humanism, due to its fundamentalized anthropocentrism, is incapable of doing so. What is to 
                                              
6 Although Heidegger has never called it anthropocentrism. In his letter On Humanism, he did mention that his 
critique of Being and Time is basically the thought that the highest humanistic provisions of the being of Man do 
not experience the proper dignity of Man yet (Sloterdijk, 2005, p.55).   
7 Prof. dr. Ulrich Libbrecht (1928-2015), a Belgian Orientalist authority philosopher on Eastern and comparative 
philosophy, developed comparative philosophy to compare Western with Eastern traditions.  
 14 
say about this critique from a humanist perspective? Will humanism reject and blackguard its 
critics as it has done in the past or will it be able to relate and learn, like Ulrich Libbrecht’s 
comparative philosophy attempts to do? I find it very hard to believe that humanistic wisdom 
is solely gained by Western philosophy and that Eastern thought would have no considerable 
value. The Chinese nature-based Daoism, humanist Confucianism and cognitive-reflective 
Chinese Buddhism have been criticizing each other’s philosophy of life since their beginning 
at around 350 BCE, mostly on the political and personal level of technical acting. Is there 
nothing to be learned from for humanistic philosophy? If Heidegger has been inspired in his 
critique on humanism by Eastern thought, who is considered a core Western philosopher in 
the Humanistic Canon, should we not explore Eastern thought more willingly? And could we 
not find clues in Eastern thought on the issue of anthropocentrism as well?  
In this thesis, we will see a Western critique on anthropocentrism explored by German 
philosophers as Martin Heidegger’s Sein (Being), Peter Sloterdijk’s affair (hyper moralism) 
and Dominican theologist Meister Eckhart’s Gelassenheit (imperturbability). Later on, we 
will bridge Martin Heidegger with Daoism and then view the discussion between Daoism and 
Confucianism on their different views on humanity and humanness. An exploration of 
Daoism’s main principles Dao, De (inner power) and wu wei (non-acting) is made to open 
understanding for Eastern thought and how Heidegger’s thought may be influenced. This will 
end in implications of a new perspective and insights from traditional Eastern thought for the 
debate on anthropocentrism and on issues with humanist philosophy. 
To aid the reader, I have made a timeline schematic (fig.1) that summarizes the 
broadness of the thesis. The schematic summarizes couple key elements necessary in linking 
Heidegger’s criticism on humanism to Daoist criticism, which then reflects a critique on 
western anthropocentrism in humanism. The timeline arrows end at the second block as that 
is where the current known wisdom ends. They do not necessarily comply fully as 
extrapolation, but should rather be understood as resonances with the essence of criticism on 
the exaltation of Mankind. The point being that modern humanism is, perhaps unsuccessfully, 
attempting to tackle anthropocentrism from within, while Daoism, Confucianism and 
Buddhism in China have this unique history of over ~2300 years seeking wisdom on what 
humans should think, be and are. And that humanism could learn insights that may break 
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Fig 1. Timeline schematic of the core elements in this master thesis.  
2002: Anthropocene debate:  




This text has three linked purposes: 1. to examine the position of modern humanism in their 
answer to anthropocentrism. 2. to illustrate a, for Humanistic Canon unknown, undeniable 
influential Eastern source in Heidegger’s Being. 3. to explore the critique of Daoism on the 
way of culture of Confucianism as a parallel insight to humanist anthropocentrism. Daoist 
insights may help criticize an implicated underperformance of horizontalizing radicalization 
of humanism by humanist philosophers. More concretely, the essence of Daoism’s spiritual 
critique on Confucian humanity concepts is extrapolated to the modern humanist, 
anthropocentric implicated, answer to anthropocentrism.  
 
Main thesis 
How do anti-metaphysical criticisms of Martin Heidegger, Peter Sloterdijk and Meister 
Eckhart relate to the Daoist criticism on the Confucian concept of humanity and be 




- How did the western humanism debate on anthropocentrism develop?  
- How do Heidegger, Sloterdijk and Eckhart relate in their criticism on western philosophical 
tradition, in particular humanism? 
- What kind of critique did Daoism have on the Confucian humanist way of culture?  
- Which similarities are suggested between Heidegger's thought on Being and Daoist 
principles? 
- What implications does Daoist spirituality have on anthropocentrism and humanism? 
1.3 List of definitions  
For a better understanding of the contents, some main concepts and choices are described and 
explained.  
Humanism  
Humanism has a broad spectrum from anti-religious atheist and rationalist humanism on one 
end to religious and spiritual humanism at the other end (Van Ijssel, 2007). I have 
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operationalized the term - modern or secular - humanism in this thesis as a Dutch-German 
humanism that bases its values on the Enlightment philosophy such as Bildung (self-
development), rationalism, freedom of thought and anthropocentrism. By addressing Man 
and the humanist as an animal rationale in the western philosophical tradition, an opportunity 
arises to position humanism in a similar parallelized debate like the Chinese traditions of 
humanist Confucianism and nature-based Daoism have been. But even in spiritual humanism, 
anthropocentrism in humanism remains an issue. Even though spiritual humanists feel 
spiritually connected to a cosmos or to nature, its philosophy does not assume a pure 
horizontal position among other life forms. However, according to Van IJssel, spiritual 
humanists would have the advantage of understanding connectedness to a holistic whole or to 
the cosmos (2007, p. 184-187). There lies a possibility to seek a beyond-anthropos 
relationship with nature that could be extrapolated to other life forms. In this thesis, the 
interlocutions between the humanist Confucianism and nature-based Daoism are examined to 
illustrate the difference between Confucian humanity and Daoist humanness. It may aid as an 
enrichment in the discussion on rethinking our spiritual or religious relationship with Earth. 
Traditional Chinese thought 
Sinologists such as Jana S. Rosker (2009), Kristofer Schipper (2010) and Belgian philosopher 
Patricia De Martelaere (2006) agree that a Kantian or Descartian-like systemic rationalist 
philosophy with an epistemology (knowledge theory) or metaphysical features has not 
developed in early Chinese tradition. In western philosophical – and theological - tradition, 
subject and object are separated domains. In Eastern thought, subject and object cannot be 
seen separate (Bulhof, 2005; De Martelaere, 2006). As an example, Yin and Yang are two 
sides of a unity but cannot be fully understood when separated. Does this mean that 
‘philosophy’ is a European thing? Slovenian sinologist Jana S. Rosker argues that it means 
that Chinese thought actually had a different philosophical discourse “such as the method of 
correlative thought, and principal binary categories such as yin yang 陰陽, zhi xing 知性 
(knowledge and action), xing qing 性情 (nature and emotion) and jian bai 堅白 (consistency 
and attribute)” if compared to the “almost technocraticly delimited categorical and 
terminological apparati” western tradition (2009, p.229). Therefore, Chinese thought or 
Chinese philosophy needs to be understood as a different kind of wisdom-seeking, simply 
because its philosophies were intrinsically related while western traditions separated. Yet, in 
both ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ traditions, we should not forget that the love for wisdom still 
holds true albeit in different ways.  
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Confucian way of culture 
In the discussion between Daoism and Confucianism, the way of culture is mentioned for two 
reasons. ‘Way’ because in Chinese language and in this particular case, it is meant as a path 
to follow and ‘culture’ because in Daoism, it is critiqued as the anthropocentric normativity. 
When Daoism critiques the Confucian way of culture, Daoism is basically criticizing 
Confucian social concept of humanity (ren). In Confucianism, there are normative rituals to 
follow for every single occasion. A person with a specific ranking would sit at a specific 
place and behave in specific ways as the ritual would prescribe. This Confucian way of 
culture would help maintain order in human society, because everyone knows its place and 
thus his norms to act (Schipper, 2010). To Confucianism, behaving according to human 
norms is a characteristic and expression of well-developed humanity (Delaune, 2005).  
Mysticism  
Derived from the Greek adjective mustikos (Latin: mysticus), it refers to a connection with 
the mysteries in which an individual is initiated and hushes (Libbrecht in Van IJssel, 2007, 
p.30). Van Ijssel (2007) comprised the opinions on difference between religious and mystic 
experience as a slope. A religious experience is when the I becomes confronted with the 
transcendental, the holy, the ground of Being, the Absolute Reality and becomes mystic when 
the I becomes one with this or the I falls away (Van Ijssel, 2007, p.80). According to emeritus 
professor of University Leiden Ilse Bulhof, mysticism has not been highly regarded in 
western philosophical and theological tradition8 because it seems immature to think non-
dually (2005, p.301). Non-duality thinking means to let subject and object be one and the 
same (ibid). Bulhof uses the example of a religious person experiencing the mystic 
unification with God. Dualistic thinking rejects this, because it does not metaphysically allow 
a religious person to be the same as God. According to Davidson (n.d.) and Van Ijssel (2007), 
humanism steered far away from mysticism due to Enlightment ideals until the 20th century. 
Mysticism, such as the mystic experience of becoming one with God, is in western religious 
mystic context is not alien but it is berated by the western philosophical Enlightment ideals 
(Bulhof, 2005; Van IJssel, 2007). Mysticism became rather polemic due to the conceptual 
theoretical thought and so the experiential and bodily comprehension of spirituality has 
gradually been lost in Western culture (Van Ijssel, 2007, p.32). Adri Smaling & Hans Alma 
                                              
8 And thus humanism as well (Davidson, n.d.; Van Ijssel, 2007, p. 
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(2010) made a connection between transcendence and meaning (zingeving) to spirituality. 
Meaning is a more or less continues transcendence of the immediacy: a transcending 
experience of meaning; they called it ‘horizontal meaning’ (ibid). “Mysticism in its very 
nature defies the analysis of logic, and logic is the most characteristic feature of Western 
thought”. (Suzuki, 1964, p.35). Mysticism in Eastern thought is rather to be understood as 
“an experience that baffles all languages” (Suzuki, 1964, p.12). Satori9 (Enlightment) is a 
‘mysterium ineffabile’ and comes as something unexpected, not to be expected.” (ibid, p.95). 
“Satori is the raison d’être of Zen, and without it there is no Zen.” (ibid, p.12). To understand 
the East, mysticism must be understood (Suzuki, 1964). And so, a way to understand Eastern 
mysticism is through understanding spirituality as a universal phenomenon of horizontal 
transcendence in becoming a ‘whole’ person (Fowler, 2015).  
Hermeneutics  
Hermeneutics (Maso & Smaling, 2009) is understood as an interpretation theory. It is 
validated in some forms of qualitative research. More importantly, it is used to interpret texts. 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s works (1833-1911) on hermeneutics concentrated on the time-related 
‘inner senses of meaning’. Dilthey made effort to distinguish human sciences from natural 
sciences by acknowledging that the lived experience (erlebnis) is fundamental to human 
being (Thiselton, 2009, p.290). In our case, this means reading and interpreting texts by 
understanding things as the spirit, culture, history and meanings of the writer in his time 
period.10  
Humanist chaplaincy  
In Dutch language, humanist chaplaincy is mostly called humanistisch geestelijke verzorging 
(humanist spiritual care), humanistische geestelijke begeleiding (humanist spiritual 
accompaniment) or humanistisch geestelijk (raads)werk (humanist spiritual ((council)) 
work). But these terms are not commonly used in English language to define spiritual 
caregiving of humanist denomination. Therefore, I have conformed to using the most 
commonly known English and American term humanist chaplaincy that is used by the 
American and British Humanist Association instead of the more neutral and correct term 
                                              
9 The Japanese-Buddhist translation and softly defined as ‘a strange perception of unsurpassed singularity’. 
(Suzuki, 1964, p.9) 
10 To simplify reading, I have tried to keep the written individual to the male gender. Obviously, all other 
genders apply as well. 
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spiritual caregiving to aid in the readability of this thesis. In the Dutch professional standard 
for spiritual caregiving (2015), spiritual care is defined as: professional guidance, assistance 
and advice on meaning and philosophy of life.  
1.4 Relevance to Humanistic Studies  
This thesis has sought philosophical grounds to intervene in the humanist debate on the 
Anthropocene by addressing an implicated inability of humanism to transcend its 
anthropocentrism via reflection on Daoist criticism on Confucian humanity concepts. To 
humanistic studies, and to the Humanistic Canon, the unfamiliarity of Daoist influence on 
Heidegger’s philosophy illustrates a philosophical gap in the possible understandings of 
Heidegger’s philosophy. The gap suggests that Heidegger’s philosophy may be better 
understood if its Eastern sources, and in particular Daoism, is explored. Future comparative 
researches in Eastern philosophies and traditions that may have other insights on Mankind 
due to a totally different philosophical discourse. Exploring these insights and their Eastern 
sources, next to Zen-Buddhism, may help invigorate modern – western – humanism into a 
more universal humanism. Another implication is that in the current debate on 
anthropocentrism Dutch humanist philosophers are not yet able to radically horizontalize 
humanism’s supraposition. This implication gives solid grounds to explore the critique on 
humanity that has been ongoing between the Chinese traditions Daoism and Confucianism. 
These implications primarily show two weaknesses in modern humanism: 1. failure to 
understand and relate Martin Heidegger’s criticism to Eastern spirituality, 2. humanism’s 
self-criticism is anthropocentric in its nature. The results of this thesis may help reinvigorate 
humanism, enrich the Anthropocene debate, invite humanist thinkers to further explore 
Eastern thought, help understand Eastern humanism concepts and be reflective of the dangers 
of humanism’s own dogmatism. This thesis aids in the research program Critical 
Regeneration of Humanistic Traditions and Values of the University for Humanistic Studies.  
1.5 Methodology 
In Chapter 2, I have attempted to interpret the comments and critique on anthropocentrism by 
high-profiled German thinkers Martin Heidegger, Peter Sloterdijk, Meister Eckhart and 
current Dutch humanist philosophers as Harry Kunneman and Peter Manschot. The texts of 
Letter on Humanism and Being and Time by Martin Heidegger has been high-profiled 
because he publicly opened a space for thought towards posthumanism. I rather see it as a 
criticizing re-orientation of humanism instead of posthumanism. By criticizing the narrow 
scientific and rational view on reality, Heidegger attempted to bring humans back closer to 
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Being which we now understand as being authentic (Delaune, 2015; Dreyfus, 1991). This 
critique of bringing humans back closer to Being will be proven to be influenced by Daoist 
thought on humanness versus – Confucian - humanity. Sloterdijk (2009a) advanced on 
Heidegger’s thought towards the dangers of genetic manipulation by addressing the 
‘arrogance’ of humanist anthropocentrism. In Meister Eckhart’s mysticism – and Heidegger’s 
philosophy - , imperturbability (gelassenheit) is suggested to reveal Being of humans. This 
imperturbability resonates with the Daoist concept of wu wei. Chapter 2 is therefore an 
exploration of the essence of critique on anthropocentrism and to examine hints at Daoist and 
Eastern influences in Heidegger’s thought. By exploring this, a picture is made of the main 
issues with anthropocentrism.  
 
In Chapter 3, concepts of Daoism Dao, De, wu wei and the Daoist Art of Living are explored 
as context for the discussion with Confucianism. Sources from experts on sinology and 
Daoism philosophy such as Kristofer Schipper, Patricia de Martelaere en Tu Weiming are 
consulted on these Daoist concepts to show Daoist critique on the Confucian way of culture, 
basically Confucian anthropocentrism. I will also elaborate on the similarities of Heidegger’s 
Being with Dao and Gelassenheit with wu wei. However, Chinese philosophy is under 
western scrutiny for being superficial due to its practical wisdom. Instead of analyzing 
metaphysics, Chinese wisdom concentrated on the practicality of its philosophies and 
traditions. Chinese thought, and in particular Daoism, is examined to illustrate Daoist main 
principles as critique on Confucian thought on humanity. I have added chapters of the main 
book Dao De Jing (Schipper, 2010)11 of Daoism to help get a feeling for the associative 
meanings of Daoist terminology and philosophy. Lastly, clues to Daoist influence on 
Heidegger will be shown by several philosophers that are experts on Heidegger and Daoism. 
Here we find an undeniable bridge between Heidegger’s criticism on western philosophical 
traditions and Eastern thought on spirituality. This opens a space to think about the 
enrichment Eastern thought can or cannot bring to modern humanism and western 
philosophical tradition.  
 
In Chapter 4, I will discuss the commensurability and incommensurability of Daoism with 
modern humanism. Daoism defies humanity, because from Daoist perspective humanity 
exists as consequence of disharmonization with the Dao. In Daoist perspective, finding De 
                                              
11 Also compared with the translations from Jaap Voigt (2011). Original work by Lao Zi around 300 BCE  
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(inner power) as the inner moral strength, leads to a more natural way to Be. In essence, 
Daoism calls upon humans to be more authentic by harmonizing with the Dao through De. 
Humanity concepts are therefore considered irrelevant, because humans are being human, 
instead of humanized. In the latter half, I will have humanist philosopher Joep Dohmen 
confront Daoism on the arguments made for and against anthropocentrism. This chapter 
entails the confrontation and (in)commensurability of Daoism with humanism. 
 
In the chapter Final Considerations, I will answer the thesis’s questions and try to find Daoist 
potential enrichment for Dutch modern humanism. Also, I will implicate possibilities of 
understanding Daoist insights in the humanism debate on the Anthropocene.  
Chapter 2 Critique on anthropocentrism  
The Anthropocene is currently being debated as the era in which Mankind is causing a 
sustainability crisis (Ten Bos, 2017). As consequence, the philosophical reflection on the 
Anthropocene has led to the debate on anthropocentrism in human sciences. Dutch 
geophilosopher René ten Bos (2017) thinks that Mankind is wandering in the Anthropocene 
without knowing what it is doing to nature and when it realizes, what to do about it. Dutch 
high-profiled humanist philosophers such as Henk Manschot, Wouter Achterberg, Hans 
Achterhuis and Harry Kunneman have made attempts to reconcile Mankind with nature. 
However, choosing a normative frame and lifestyle without leaving the basis of the animal 
rationale has publicly troubled many western humanism critics since Heidegger’s Letter on 
Humanism. To Heidegger, all current –isms – and thus humanism as well - are traditionally 
formed by the same and singular philosophical framework: ‘mankind is an animal rationale’ 
(Heidegger, 2005). This framework means that Man is a thinking animal and invents rules for 
himself through knowledge and metaphysical reasoning. So, to Heidegger, any –ism 
philosophy basically grounds itself in metaphysics and derives ethical behavior based on this 
reasoned knowledge. Heidegger’s critique on metaphysics is that this way of the animal 
rationale thinking in all ‘–isms’ abberates from its original Being (ibid). Here, we find a first 
sign of Daoist thought. In Chinese context, Daoism defies Confucian humanity, because 
humanity and ethics are considered a consequence of disharmonization with human nature or 
humanness from Daoist perspective (Froese, 2006; Parkes, 1990). In the western 
philosophical discourse, Heidegger attempted a non-anthropocentric position on the essence 
of Man (Being); namely that Mankind in his existence does not make the world, but that Man 
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appears existentially in an already existing world (da sein). So, Heidegger says, man must 
consider the philosophical frameworks and ‘herd' Being (2005, p.57). His position opposes a 
metaphysics with a humanist makeability ideal in which all meanings are anthropocentrically 
decided. What human nature is, is not asked in the entire western philosophical tradition and 
persistently according to Heidegger (1999). In the spirit of Heidegger, German philosopher 
Peter Sloterdijk (2009b) also confronts humanism in Rules of the Human Zoo. These two 
philosophers will take the stage in this thesis due to their orientation on the Chinese 
philosophy of Daoism. Heidegger's attempt and Sloterdijk's reaction to Heidegger are 
explained as some of the fundamental criticisms in the European philosophical tradition on 
anthropocentrism. Another indication of Daoist influence on Heidegger is the resonance of 
Heidegger’s gelassenheit (imperturbability) with the Daoist concept of wu wei. In his work 
Country Path Conversations, Heidegger (2010) absorbs the term gelassenheit Dominican 
mysticist Meister Eckhart (1260-1328) uses. Eckhart’s thinking on interreligious dialogue of 
Multiple Religious Belonging (identifying yourself or belonging to multiple religions) and his 
thinking about unity spirituality (dominicanen.nl, 2014) is currently being read with vigor by 
many Christians and Buddhists due to his resonance with Zen of Zen-Buddhism. The term 
Zen is derived from the Chinese transliteration (ch’an-na; zenna in Japanese) of the original 
Sanskrit (Suzuki, 1964, p.32). Zen-Buddhism originated from the Chinese Chan-Buddhism. 
The latter has been most influenced by Daoism, particularly in its aspect of Zen. Zen’s mystic 
freedom of thought resonates with Daoism’s wu wei and Eckhart’s gelassenheit which have 
influenced Heidegger’s philosophy. I implicate that Daoist philosophy resonates with their 
thoughts on some issues with humanity and humanism. There we will find common grounds 
on a missing insight in the current humanist critique on anthropocentrism. Also, by choosing 
these three thinkers, I want to illustrate the dogmatic behavior of hyper-moralist critics who 
have blackguarded Heidegger, Sloterdijk and Eckhart. It is to show a critique that an 
anthropocentric dogmatism has nested in modern humanism; one that beholds the danger of 
making humanism unable to self-criticize, and be criticized, due to its overly focus on 
reasoned humanity and a waning sight of humanness. While humanist philosopher Harry 
Kunneman (2017) made a similar warning through the explanation of domination by 
logopoiesis in humanism; my attempt is to warn from an Oriental philosophical discourse and 
from a non-anthropocentric Daoist perspective.  
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2.1 The current humanism debate on anthropocentrism  
On the website of Humanistic Canon, Professor Doctor Davidson (n.d.) claims that at first 
sight, sustainability seems to be an obvious aim for humanism. Humanism aims at enhancing 
the quality of life for humans, a human-worthy life (Derkx, 2004, p.65). In its humanist 
history, anthropocentrism became a fundamentalized rational argument against religion. A 
common humanist phrase is to say, humans are central in this reality – thus not God –. This 
way of thinking gave humanists legitimized meaning to autonomous rational thinking, insofar 
that they could decide to give meaning to their own lives instead of being in service of God 
(Derkx, 2004). Founding father of modern Dutch humanism, Jan van Praag, defined 
humanism to be conscious of the relationship with his surroundings and the other, the other 
includes everything that makes the other (ibid, p.65). Therein, the worth and value of the self 
is not disrespected, but is still focused on the whole, and in that sense is humanism anti-
egoistic, Van Praag says (ibid, p.65). But in current times, anthropocentrism of Mankind is 
acknowledged to be devaluating the environment and non-human beings. There is enough 
scientific evidence on climate-change, decreasing amounts of biological diversity and natural 
resources to know that future generations will not be able to sustain current Mankind’s way 
of life (Davidson, n.d.). Humanism, apparently, has not been able to divert the arrogance of 
Mankind’s self for itself to the other. In The Netherlands, the orations and works of humanist 
philosophers such as Hans Achterhuis12 (1990), Wouter Achterberg13 (1992), Marcel 
Wissenburg14 (2007), Henk Manschot (2010)15 and Harry Kunneman16 (2017) have 
acknowledged this threat to Mankind, but argued that humanism is compatible with the non-
human nature in a biocentric or ecocentric world view. Together, they suggest that humanism 
has primarily been an anthropocentric thinking in which nature did not have intrinsic value, 
something only humans have had. However, they claim that humanism should be compatible 
with a healthy scepsis on the potential of technology and that caring for nature needs to be 
approached with precaution (Davidson, n.d.). In their reasoning, it is due to anthropocentrism 
that humanist organizations and humanists have kept nature soulless and subordinate to the 
wishes, needs and demands of humans (Achterhuis 1990; Wissenburg, 2007).  
A stark illustration of this phenomenon in humanist organizations are the conclusions 
of the first ecology conference of the Humanistic Covenant in The Netherlands in 1975. The 
                                              
12 on the silence of Dutch humanism concerning environment issues 
13 on the problematic relationship between anthropocentric humanism and ecocentrism 
14 on the seemingly impossibility of humanism to go beyond utility value 
15 on changing a human centered to a cosmos centered world view  
16 on radicalizing the horizontalization of humans with other life forms  
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conference developed a report in which only three small paragraphs were formulated on bio-
ethics, but with fivefold of text on control of human population growth and human 
consumption (in Wissenburg, 2007). At the world congresses of the International Humanist 
and Ethical Union (IHEU), humanist morality would be condensed into 1. educating humans 
to better moral behavior, 2. using technology to fix environment problems and 3. 
surbordination of the non-human in service for mankind (Wissenburg, 2007, p.3). It is due to 
a strong Dutch humanist lobby that the IHEU started a resolution in 1992 to look beyond 
human’s instrumental view on nature by ‘embracing sustainability and birth control for the 
benefit of Man and other forms of life’ (ibid, p.4) . An increased attention for bio-ethics by 
humanists and by Socrates-professor Paul Cliteur have helped create humanist space to think 
responsible for the fate of animals, albeit from an animal-as-human perspective (ibid). Under 
the leadership of the positivist Cliteur (1993-1995), the Dutch Humanist Covenant 
(Humanistisch Verbond, HV) had an atheistic, antireligious and antispiritual humanist 
discourse (Spekschoor, n.d.; Van Ijssel, 2007, p.173). Humanism as an organization and 
philosophy did not need or have an ethical or spiritual reason to feel responsible for nature, 
but one to Mankind’s own sustainability by keeping the environment livable (Wissenburg, 
2007). To religious and spiritual humanists, this was a shortage of meaning and connection 
with deeper meanings of life (Van Ijssel, 2007). Former professor theory of the philosophy of 
life Fons Elders of the UvH critiques that modern humanism to have identified itself too 
much with a progressive, secular, science-technology world view –  anchored in the 
Enlightment philosophy – of which the moral-free, reasonable human is the center (in Van 
Ijssel, 2007, p.178). On individual levels, humanists do seem to have interest in linking 
humanism with sustainability, for example Indian humanist Vikas Gora:  
 
Humanism is inseparable from the environment. (...) Climate change and global 
warming have been recent scary developments. But sadly many of those involved tend 
to magnify the issues so much that an individual feels out of place and unqualified or 
incapable of bringing about change for the better. Humanists have a role to play in 
showing that an eco-friendly lifestyle can lessen the consequences of environmental 
degradation. It brings to the fore the necessity of developing alternative sources of 




Wissenburg (2007) mentioned that humanist organizations did not seem to be interested in 
being environmentally friendly, because theoretically anthropocentrism in humanism causes 
humanists to centralize humans in reality and subordinate all non-human things. Therefore, 
Wissenburg opts for reasoning that choosing how to relate to nature makes a difference to the 
identity of humans as a human and therefore humanism as a social relevant movement in 
sustainability-thinking. Humanism is intrinsically not connected with nature at all; but 
humanism is not about how to live well, but is about choosing and justifying a lifestyle 
(Wissenburg, 2007, p.6). By acknowledging the social construct of Man with nature and the 
excessive positivism of the Enlightment, Man could see nature as a construct of autonomous 
design. Within this construct Man would be able to shape and transform its self-image (ibid, 
p.6). To Wissenburg, the choice to form an identity is key to deciding to our self-image of 
Man. Yet, this would mean that making this choice is a human-valued choice. An 
anthropocentric choice.  
  
2.1.1 Anthropocosmos 
Humanist professor of the UvH Henk Manschot attempts a humanist cosmological 
perspective on ecology, starting with a contemplation on how the Anthropocene is connected 
with modern life by examining the character of German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
(1883-1891) Zarathustra in Nietzsche’s philosophical book Also sprach Zarathustra. To 
Manschot, Nietzsche was one of the most sensitive philosophers to unspoken things that were 
happening in society. The book calls for the awakening of the ecological human, who leaves 
leaves his nature-hostile behavior behind in the modern age (Manschot, n.d.). Manschot, in 
agreement with the Chinese Confucian philosopher Tu Weiming, says that modern core 
values of humanism are not outdated, but need to be put in a larger cosmological perspective. 
A broader framework in which Mankind lives and thus moving from an anthropocentric to an 
anthropocosmic world view. Confucian critique must be given on the detachment of human 
life from the larger picture17 says Tu (in Manschot, 2010, p.9).  
 
Not the human but the life of the earthly18 community as a whole, focused on a shared 
future, must become the umbrella framework. The values of life, liberty and the pursuit of 
                                              
17 Heaven in Confucian terms 
18 As in, all life forms 
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happiness in which the Enlightenment mentality is summarized, will then return in a new 
form. (Tu in Manschot, 2010, p.9-10) 
 
Tu wants to turn the anthropocentric view into an anthropocosmic view by considering 
humanity values as ones that concern all life forms, not just humans or humanists. In Tu’s 
perspective Neo-Confucianism, compared to the secular humanism, is an inclusive humanism 
with an anthropocosmic idea, but will therefore need to develop its spiritual tradition […] in 
religiosity as provides human beings “with a sense of deep awe towards Heaven and Nature; 
without this sense of transcendence, human life would be shallow” (Hung, n.d., 
Anthropocosmic Unity section, paragraph two). Manschot prefers a secular definition of a 
anthropocosmic perspective. Tu Weiming based his perspective on religiosity in neo-
Confucianism19. For Manschot, being a secular humanist philosopher, he says that the human 
and world view should be designed in accordance with the current scientific insights on the 
origin of the cosmos and development of evolution (2010, p.10). Manschot (2010) calls it 
cosmogenesis, the ‘process of becoming’ of the cosmos. The base of his design on creating an 
anthropocosmic perspective is that Man has its own place and meaning within the becoming-
process of the cosmos. In many philosophies of life, a core idea exists that Man has an active, 
unique and conscious role to play in the cosmogenesis. Manschot argues that acknowledging 
this role means that the choices and decisions of humans should not be addressed as being 
evolutionary preprogrammed nor be called a byproduct or epiphenomena of the evolutionary 
process itself (ibid, p.10). To Manschot, this implies that Man is conscious of what he does 
and wants to become. Manschot offers three orientations on his proposed anthropocosmic 
perspective (2010, p.10-16): 
1. An adequate evolutionary vision built around the current scientific insights and 
offering the option to situate the phase of modernity and to evaluate in the wider 
context of the cosmogenesis process.  
2. The question how moral responsibility can be extended from Man to all lifeforms. As 
life on Earth has become dependent on human action, human responsibility should be 
enhanced as well. The extension lays base for new meanings of humanity and 
humanization.  
3. Concerns the function and the meaning of life meaning in the life of humans. The 
human is a meaning-giving being and gives his reality meaning. It changes the 
                                              
19 Neo-Confucianism refers to seeking an organic unity between Transcendent Man and Heaven 
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positioning of Man so that meaning-giving institutions will explicitly theorize on this 
transformation, next to their philosophies and culture.  
 
Unlike the world religions and indigenous cultures, humanism does not have ‘origin’ insights 
or images on the relationship of Man with Earth or the cosmos. As Manschot (2010; 
Manschot, n.d.) argues, while the former can find meaning in their traditions, humanism may 
need to find her strength by developing a new perspective on relating to the cosmos by 
absorbing all discoveries and new insights. Manschot (2010) calls on interlocutors such as 
Greek and Roman philosophies as the Stoa, but also the Romantic Movement. Philosophers 
like Rousseau, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche have helped shape the sensibility as 
fascination for the wildness in nature. The experience of feeling Nature’s greatness and her 
power has been dubbed ‘The Sublime’ by 18th century philosophers. Manschot (2010) clues 
that these philosophers were impressed by nature and started to attack the subject-object 
paradigm to make spiritual thought possible of unification with the Sublime. A characteristic 
of the sublime experience is that Man is overwhelmed and confused by nature’s power and 
the feelings that come with it. The sublime experience breaches the safe frameworks of 
subject-object schemas on the basis of how Man orientates himself in the world. She feeds 
the imagination and the desire to enter the bigger picture and experience unity. In Manschot 
(2010, p.19), Schopenhauer emphasizes for example, that the experience of the sublime 
nature drives us beyond ourselves, separates us from everyday perception and life, and clears 
the way to a reality of becoming.  
Deep Ecology, developed by the Nordic philosopher Arne Naess in the early 70’s, 
attempted a counterculture and nature-orientated philosophy, one that radically criticized the 
detachment of human civilization with nature and distanced itself from shallow ecology20 by 
focusing on the rights of all life forms. To Manschot, this counterculture held the danger of 
moving away from human techné and civilization which by itself would lead to a nature 
narcissism (ibid, p.20). But if this thinking were to be reflected and re-interpreted, it could 
help humanism position itself in the Anthropocene debate. For humanism, a challenge exists 
to reflect on the friction between cosmic evolution and ecological destruction by Man. As 
lead-up, humanism should formulate a humanist-cosmological vision in which Mankind 
designs a framework with scientific evidence (ibid).  
                                              
20 An ecologic thinking that centers the survival of Mankind by sustaining its environment 
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2.1.2 Radical humanism  
In his farewell speech at the UvH, Harry Kunneman acknowledges that modern humanism in 
overall has played a central part in culturally legitimizing Humankind’s apathy of the quality 
of life for other life forms on our planet (2017, p.18). Some earlier mentioned humanist 
philosophers have criticized these vertical relationships with nature but are still in minority in 
modern humanism. Kunneman acknowledges other philosophies such as the Ubuntu, 
Daoism, Buddhism as well as early Greek humanism to have a horizontalizing and 
humanized critique. But in the spirit of Edward Said, Kunneman thinks humanism has to 
criticize and counter vertical anthropocentrism needs to base this critique on its own tradition 
(2017, p.19). Kunneman calls these vertical relationships with other life forms vertical 
anthropocentrism because it visualizes a power relation as supraposition of Man being higher 
than other ‘lower’ life forms. To Kunneman (2017), humanism should radicalize its aspect of 
horizontalization and thus create equal power relation. Humanism may learn a lot from the 
outside, but can be allowed to advance by its own characteristics of horizontalization and 
self-critical thinking (ibid, p.19). According to Kunneman, the first step is to acknowledge 
that humanity is older than the homo sapiens and distributed across many life forms. 
Biologists are shifting the focus from the differences to the continuity between humans and 
other life forms. Scientific evidence of biologists such as Frans de Waal show that humans do 
not have the sole understanding of good and evil, nor of cultural transferable knowledge and 
techné (ibid, p.20). With the knowledge produced by De Waal, Kunneman proposes to 
understand humanization as a multi-billion-year development process of reasonably well 
living between organisms that resulted in a relational spectrum from katapoiesis (destructive 
creation)21 to diapoiesis (dialogical creation). Then humanity can be understood as a 
lifeforms wide philosophy of life, based on three outputs:  
1. The ability to perform embodied relationships with other biotics, 
2. The ability to experience pain and joy and understand the bodily and social 
touchability and vulnerability,  
3. The ability to work with and learn from the tension between katapoietic and diapoietic 
forms of social bonding.  
Using these definitions of humanization and humanity, vertical anthropocentrism can be bent 
horizontally. The second step towards a radicalized humanism, as his farewell speech title 
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‘Radical Humanism’ suggests, is to understand the difference between humanity and 
humanness. Humanness does not equal humanity, but in the West we have become to assume 
that it is (ibid, 25). Humanity is traditionally tied to the diapoietic22 part of the biotic 
spectrum while humanization is conceived as transcending and leaving behind autopoietic, 
destructive and exploiting forms of social bonding, he says (ibid, p.25). Kunneman adds 
logopoiesis (logic creation) as a new register, one that in its appearances as dialogos, 
ideologos, metalogos, nomologos and technologos23 (ibid, p. 29-31), human acts can to be 
understood as ways ‘to prevent and ban tensions by striving for provability and repeatability.’ 
(ibid, p.31). In other words, Kunneman (2017) argues that reasoned logics create and manage 
systems that attempt to ban frictionability, frictions that are inherently tied to embodied 
relational work. The developments of these logic systems are accelerating, but are becoming 
unmanageable. The dynamic questions involved in the creation of logic and the tension 
between katapoiesis and diapoiesis look quite like ‘slow questions’ [trage vragen] (ibid). 
Coined by Kunneman, slow questions are questions that do not have an immediate answer 
and need time to be pondered upon. The third step is a consequential step from the first two: 
1. accept that humanity predates homo sapiens and is distributed among many life forms and 
2. accept that humanness of the homo sapiens is not the same as, but overlaps humanity 
partially and enriches it. Modern humanism has become too focused on autonomy, scientific 
rationalism and Bildung, resulting from logopoietic abilities of Man (ibid). A vertical 
anthropology has made the logopoiesis as prime and categorized all other poiesis, and thus 
from other life forms as well, as animalistic. In other words, Man decided to become a logical 
and reasoning animal rationale and rejected all other forms of poiesis. Therefore, the third 
step is to understand that humanness is becoming problematic in a predating process of 
humanization (ibid. p.32). Humanists would have to understand that they are embodied 
humans with slow questions who are taking part in the humanization process. So, Kunneman 
suggests a radical humanism that horizontalizes relationships with other life forms by 
acknowledging that humanity is a shared concept among many life forms on Earth and by 
acknowledging the acts of embodied paralogical relationships in our humanity (ibid) with 
other life forms. In Daoist perspective, Kunneman is closest to Daoist critique on 
anthropocentrism as later chapters will show. But how come Kunneman’s humanity is to be 
                                              
22 A portmanteau word of Kunneman of dialogue and poiesis (the manifestation of an activity that did not exist 
before) in which Kunneman describes as when biotics adjust their acts on others to make the relationship 
pleasant or lustful (2017, p.24). 
23 The created and reasoned logics that form the metaphysical world 
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considered a core principle that predates humans? Does the word humanity not fundamentally 
tie to humans and thus Anthropos? Does this not insinuate that Kunneman’s humanity 
actually is still anthropocentrically motivated?  
 It appears that the similarities among the humanist philosophers on the debate on 
anthropocentrism are mostly 1. to get rid of the vertical anthropocentric relationships with 
other life forms and horizontalize this by making other life forms equal to humans, 2. accept 
embodied and experiential spirituality, as being embodied and re-iterate a social relationship 
with nature and 3. self-criticize the underlying motives of unsustainability of Mankind 
towards relationships with other life forms.  
2.2 Martin Heidegger’s Dasein 
In Western philosophical discourse, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is considered to be one of 
the most controversial and important philosophers contributing to human sciences. His 
thoughts and interest concentrated on what Being (Sein) is, and thus what human-being 
(Dasein) is. Heidegger opposed Western philosophical tradition of metaphysical thinking, 
because metaphysics does not, and will not allow to, ask what Being is. To portray Man as 
‘animal rationale’ does injustice to what humanity in its entirety may behold (Heidegger, 
2005).  
On November 6, 1945, a French philosopher Jean Beaufret sends a letter to the 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger. For some years, Beaufret has been trying to analyze 
the main work of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit with compatriot Joseph Rovan in order to fathom 
Heidegger's phenomenology. On October 15, 1946, Beaufret writes a letter of thanks for his 
visit to Heidegger but his letter was not delivered due unknown circumstances. In his 
rewritten - and now published - letter of thanks, on November 10, 1946, Beaufret then posed 
a number of questions that prompted Heidegger's infamous Letter on Humanism. Beaufret's 
letter can be summarized into three questions: 1. how ontology relates to a possible ethics, 2. 
how philosophy can remain adventurous without becoming an adventurer, and 3. how new 
meaning can be given to the word 'humanism' (Heidegger, 2005, p.13-15). The reaction of 
Heidegger in the Letter on Humanism would go in great depth the last question: Heidegger’s 
critique on humanism and humanism’s loss of connection with human-being (Dasein). 
Heidegger used this opportunity to address his essay to Beaufret, but also to the public 
as well. It was quite possible that the letter was a disguised attempt to regain interest from - 
German – intelligentsia (Sloterdijk, 2009b). Before this letter, Heidegger associated himself 
 32 
with the national socialism of Adolf Hitler before the Second World War. Heidegger also was 
a member of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP, the Nazi party)24. After 
the Second World War, Heidegger was forbidden by the French Armed Forces and by 
German intelligentsia to teach because of his association with the NSDAP and his allegiance 
with the ‘dangerous’ thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche. Through his letter of reply to Beaufret, 
Heidegger was able to leave the isolation imposed on him. Heidegger's analysis on ‘a new 
meaning for humanism’ provided room for a posthumanistic discourse, which is sometimes 
also misinterpreted as a plea for an anti-humanism (Sloterdijk, 2009a). On Beaufret's third 
question: how do we give new meaning to humanism? Heidegger answers that 1. names such 
as the word 'humanism' cause mischief and 2. in that question, there is an assumption that 
humanism is losing meaning, but it is nonsensical to cling to the word humanism. (Heidegger, 
2005, p.23-25). The –isms have always eventually been distrusted by the public opinion and 
yet, the public keeps seeking for new –isms in a never-ending circle. Therefore, an –ism such 
as a humanism may not be the correct way to educate people as the techné of humanity 
inevitably will fall the same metaphysical trap.  
2.2.1 Criticizing the ‘–ism’  
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism paved the way for a posthumanism thinking by criticizing 
the way European philosophies and religions determine humanity (Heidegger, 2005, p.27). 
Those philosophical traditions, what Heidegger calls, ‘-isms’ with superficial differences, 
such as Christianity25, Marxism and existentialism teach normativity and ethics to humans 
(Heidegger, 2005. Sloterdijk, 2009a, p.27) in a metaphysical way that is crystallized. 
Heidegger says, when thinking falls out of its element, it compensates this loss by earning 
respect as a techné (a craft-like knowledge), as a schooling and culture company (Heidegger, 
2005, p.27). These –isms are not thinking anymore, but are busy with ‘philosophy’. These 
philosophies are then publicized as objectifying and –isms with authority. The effects of these 
‘–ism-companies’  have not been able to approach humanity because all forms of such –isms 
can be traced back to an Ancient philosophy metaphysics in which man is regarded as an 
animal rationale, with or without a spiritual component (ibid). And so, these philosophies do 
                                              
24 Some philosophers like Jürgen Habermas, Theodor Adorno and Emmanuel Levinas saw Heidegger’s 
philosophy as flawed due to his allegiance with the Nazi’s. Other philosophers like Hannah Arendt, Otto 
Pöggeler and Jacques Derrida have separated his politics from his philosophy to show relevant key 
philosophical insights he has made.  
25 To Heidegger (2005, p.35), Christianity can also be considered a humanism because Christianity comes down 
to soul salvation (salus aeterna) and the history of Man and because the history of Mankind has been in 
perspective of the history of salvation 
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not keep Man ‘in his element’, but decide what Man should be (ibid, p.27). Man is defined as 
an animal that thinks and must be tamed into a human person and one that differs from 
animals, plants and God. This proponent thinking of learning the rules of reality is called 
metaphysical thinking. Every new development in this philosophical tradition is therefore a 
metaphysical move in which the framework of humanity has already been determined by 
metaphysics and thus, according to Heidegger, erroneously determines humanity. To 
Heidegger (1999; 2005), the –isms [and thus humanism as well] were competing with each 
other as public variants of philosophy in their technical declarations of causes, but the truth of 
Being doesn’t come from causes and explanatory grounds. Dasein (Being-there), the human 
being, can only be understood as an existential In-der-Welt-Sein (being in the world26), an 
original grounding of Man.  
To have mankind ever come close to being, he would first have to learn to exist in the 
nameless. He must also recognize the temptation of the public domain as much as the 
powerlessness of the private domain. Before speaking, man must first let himself be 
addressed by being, with the risk that he has little or seldom something to say about 
that claim. Only in this way is the value of his being returned to the word, and to man 
the housing for winning in the truth of being. (Heidegger, 2005, p.31) 
So, we first would have to understand that the being of humanism is by definition 
metaphysical. Knowing that metaphysics makes its world, it also means that metaphysics 
doesn’t ask, but even blocks the truth of Being and it stays in a Being-forgetfulness 
(Seinsvergessenheit) (Heidegger, 2005, p.87). Heidegger argued for a deepening in humanism 
by replacing the conceptual metaphysics of humanity with an ontology of humanity and the 
ontological structure of ‘Being-in-the-world’. Simons explains that ontology is the 
philosophical study of being in general, or what applies neutrally to everything that is real 
(Simons, 2015). Ontology means: an attempt to attribute properties to entities (beings) that 
are there. To understand what ‘Being-in’ [the world] actually means, the ontological meaning 
of ‘Being-in’ needs to be examined (Heidegger, 1999). In Being and Time (1999), Heidegger 
wrote that Being-in is wrongly understood as to-be-in something as a being-present-at-hand 
in a space in relation with something else with the same kind of Being. Heidegger’s Being-in 
of Man’s Dasein should be understood as a ‘Being-at-all’ (Steiner, 1991, p.118). To 
Heidegger, these categorials do not represent the Dasein of beings. Being cannot be 
                                              
26 Or perhaps better phrased as ‘the Being, and the human as Dasein, exists in the world among other beings’ 
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understood as Being-present-at-hand. “Heidegger is saying that the notion of existential 
identity and that of world are completely wedded. To be at all is to be worldly. The everyday 
is the enveloping wholeness of being.” (ibid, p.120). So, the essence of man shows himself in 
Dasein (being-there), but not in relationship toward the world. Man is there in the world 
while Man is not and does not make Being. Man is called upon by Being. So, according to 
Heidegger, language is not for humans’ own sake, but to civilize together in this House of 
Being. 
Rather, language is the House of Being, in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he 
belongs to the truth of Being, guarding it. So the point is that in the determination of 
humanity of man as ek-sistence what is essential is not man but Being --- as the 
dimension of the exstasis of ek-sistence. (Heidegger, 1977, p.213) 
That is why Man is ‘being-there’ as shepherd of Being and, according to Sloterdijk, why 
Heidegger is certain that his criticism of humanism is not the same as an antihumanism. The 
most important element of classical humanism is to befriend through language with the other 
(Sloterdijk, 2009c). The world is the clearing where Dasein takes place under the care of the 
human being. This ontological consciousness happens before an ethical act and so the 
contemplation of Being should not be forgotten while forming Dasein. Thus, Heidegger 
concludes that thinking about beings must not be reduced to a mere absolutized training 
instrument. So, if one asks about what man distinctly does different from animals and plants, 
it is because Man feels vocated by Being and should therefore assume the role of shepherd of 
Being. Also Man acts due to Dasein, not by understanding the world in a metaphysical sense.  
Man is aware of 'being' and is called by this awareness to guard 'humanity'. The 
essence of man is more than the reasonably living entity, but man does not determine 
being, he hides being and is therefore the neighbor of Being. (Heidegger, 2005, p.81) 
Care for the human Being should be attuned to bringing Man back to his essence says 
Heidegger (1999). Through care, Dasein-with and Dasein-in becomes Dasein-for. To 
Heidegger, caring (Sorg) means to care for the presentness and obscurity of Being itself 
(Steiner, 1978). To make humans (homo) humane (humanus) and not inhumane (outside his 
essence), care is the meaning of Being. So humanity exists in human’s being. This is why 
Heidegger believes that humanism and humanitas have been based on a misunderstanding of 
the essential nature of Man due to the metaphysical limitations of the philosophical tradition 
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(Froese, 2006, p.9). As long as man defines himself as an animal rationale, humanity will 
remain subordinate to the ideas that are formed about Mankind in a long tradition.  
Insofar as thinking in 'Being and Time' is directed against humanism, this 
contradiction does not mean that such a thought would strike the opposite of the 
humane and would advocate the inhumane, defend inhumanity and degrade the 
dignity of man. Against humanism is thought, because humanism does not think of 
humanitas highly enough. The highness of man's essence is not based on the fact that 
man, as the 'subject' of the being, making up his substance, to be the power of Being, 
to let essence-being of the Being merge in the far too loudly praised 'objectivity’. 
(Heidegger, 2005, p.55-57) 
In the words of Karin de Boer, that man is not the center of the universe and does not have 
the power to control reality (in Sloterdijk, 2009a, p.52). In this, according to Heidegger, 
humanism makes a fallacy. With ‘thinking’ as a metaphysical property of man, people can 
ontologically distinguish themselves from animals and plants. For plants and animals, the 
play of Being is very narrow because they soar in their immediate surroundings. They 
coincide with their environment and cannot relate to it reflexively. That reflexivity is the 
privilege of man (Heidegger, 2005), but also an anthropological distinction of Man from 
animals and plants. This reflexivity is not only positive, because these cognitive abilities give 
humans the ability to fill in reality with meanings at their own discretion.  
Pointing towards this subject in Being and Time, Heidegger (1999) pleas with this 
reflexive freedom to pay attention to the essence of an act (Zuhandenheit) and not just to look 
at the usefulness (Vorhandenheit) of action. The usefulness of the action is again determined 
by a theoretical metaphysics. This is why Heidegger finds us looking at entities as equipment, 
based on their usefulness and designed for-tasks. A theory is devised about the usefulness of 
this action, for example being able to swim in order not to drown. Therefore the ability to 
swim is considered useful, but non-drowning does not necessarily have to be the only use of 
swimming. That depends on the meaning that is given by the I and the environment to the 
Being of swimming. The essence of swimming is then more original than the usefulness of 
not drowning. Swimming can also be for physical and mental relaxation and effort, for food 
gathering, for health promotion, in short, something that touches the intersubjective essence 
of swimming. Heidegger uses a hammer as an example: 
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Hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as 
equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way that could not possibly be 
more suitable. (...) The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize 
hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the 
more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is – as equipment. The hammering 
itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer. The kind of Being which 
equipment possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call readiness-
to-hand. (Heidegger, 1999, p. 98)27 
Heidegger maps it because he thinks Vorhandenheit, the 'objective' utility, of the action is too 
dominant in the intellectual discourse. The being-there (da Sein) of the act of swimming has 
thus been forgotten. Heidegger projects this train of thought on Mankind as man’s Dasein is 
being forgotten (Zeinsvergessenheit). Mankind has been objectified by metaphysics and 
became conceptualized into tools instead of considering oneself as intrinsic values (Froese, 
2006, p.82). In the truth of Being, Man exists when laws and rules are not conceived from 
‘reason’, but from humanity and the essence of human Being. These rules and laws are no 
longer just thoughts, but offer a hold on the essence of Man. Therefore, according to 
Heidegger, the distinction between essence and existence must not be sought, but one must 
search for a hidden relationship between essence and existence. Man does not have to shape 
the essence nor the existence of things and himself. Man should behold what kind of Dasein 
already exists. What is the hidden insight in Dasein? It is that Dasein only reveals itself when 
it, so Heidegger says, existentially graps reality. Dasein only reveals itself during a being-
with inside the world (Steiner, 1991). Heidegger uses the concept of ethos with an example of 
the Greek philosopher Heraclitus (535-475 BC) to explain this hidden insight.  
2.2.2 Story of Heraclitus as an example of Dasein 
The proverb of Heraclitus (Fragment 119): èthos anthrôpôi daimôn [character is destiny] is 
translated in a modern, non-Ancient Greek sense, as: "His own nature is man's demon.” The 
concept of èthos in ancient Greek sense means residence and daimon god. The saying goes: 
‘man lives as far as he is a man in the vicinity of god’ (Heidegger, 2005, p.109). Heidegger 
explains this on the basis of Aristotle's story about Heraclitus:  
A number of visitors came along, in the expectation that they would see the great 
thinker in an extraordinary life at work in all profundity. However, when they arrived, 
                                              
27 An undeniable similarity with the Daoist tale of ‘Cook Ding’ cutting with his knife, see Appendix C 
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they saw a shivering Heraclitus warming up in an oven. That was not the image that 
the visitors had wanted to see. Heraclitus saw the disappointment in their eyes and 
encouraged them with the words ‘einai gar enthouta theous’ (gods are also here). 
(ibid, p.109-113) 
Heidegger used the example of Heraclitus to refer to Lichtung, an open space or clearance in 
a visualised forest. One that also sits in language and where Being can be found. In this 
clearing, meaning is linguistically given to the world and to being human because the Being 
holds place there. Being only appears in transcendence of Dasein, being-there-in-the-world. 
Beings then becomes meaningful through language in this open space. Thus Being exists 
without a human perspective. The human perspective is Dasein (being-there). According to 
Heidegger, thinking about the truth of Being is not ethics nor ontology. Gods are not to be 
expected, they are there and always have been as Being. It is the visitors who have expected 
to see a formed God-image of the famous Heraclitus, their projection of his Dasein. In Zen-
Buddhism and Daoism, this worshipping of the ‘Other’ is considered problematic. Firstly, 
because the ‘Other’ is considered other than the I, and secondly that there is an I (Bulhof, 
2005, p.306)28. Using the story of Heraclitus, Heidegger illustrates that Man already exists in 
his nature. Being-there (Dasein) is already present; people should only behold what Dasein is 
(seinsverstehend). Following this line of thought, it can be concluded that Heidegger thinks 
Man should not anthropocentrically think of humanity, but should respect and listen to Being 
in an dialectic associative way. In the open clearing, Man can transcend, because then 
Mankind realizes it has made itself anthropocentric instead of having understood Mankind is 
part of a world. Heidegger's motto is to listen carefully to the language of being human in the 
open clearing. In other words, Being and Time suggests an ontology that humans could 
follow if they wanted to and that this Being is actually the human nature. To practicalize his 
philosophy of Being and Time, Heidegger attempted to make Being present itself by 
practicing his interpretation of Meister Eckhart’s gelassenheit (Parkes, 1990; Steiner, 1978). 
2.2.3 Heidegger’s Gelassenheit  
To understand Gelassenheit, we must first understand how Heidegger differs calculative 
thinking [das rechnende Denken] (Heidegger, 1966, p.46) from meditative thinking (das 
besinnliche Denken) Barbara Dalle Pezze (2006) explains. Calculative thinking calculates, 
plans and investigates to serve specific purposes such as developing new possibilities by 
                                              
28 Bulhof actually used this example to explain the Eastern issue with a Prophet 
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manipulation of thinking (Heidegger, 1966, p.46). So, calculative thinking thinks in terms of 
usefulness. But there is ‘thoughtlessness’ (gedankenlosigkeit) in this way of thinking, because 
it always rushes ahead and “never collects itself” (ibid). In this linear way of rushing forward, 
Man takes technology as countless possibilities to speed ahead and be ‘chained’ by the power 
of those technologies (ibid, p.52-53). Man becomes dependent on those technologies. To 
counter his possible unaware dependency, Man needs to be able to observe its ever fast-
forward behavior. The never-ending rush forwards keeps happening due to his 
comprehension of his Being. This line of thought is observed in Sloterdijk’s and Kunneman’s 
criticism. Mankind is aware of its death (Sein-zum-Tode) and thus rushes with technological 
devices to ‘save time’. But dulled by the thoughtless rushing using technology, Man lives 
shackled, forgets his Being and forgets the freedom he had before, Heidegger (2005) says. 
Meditative thinking relieves itself of the logic system of rushing ahead of death, so that an 
associative thinking remembers Being. Meditative thinking is to take time to ponder, observe 
and be aware of the things happening in and around us. But meditative thinking has an 
abundant amount of conditions before it can be entered, it keeps focus on our Being and our 
freedom from the shackling of these technologies due to its awareness that calculative 
thinking cannot have. This would be Heidegger’s ‘releasement toward things’ (die 
Gelassenheit zu den dingen) (ibid, p.54). Instead of thinking calculated in terms of 
usefulness, thinking becomes about pondering on hidden meanings. This resonates with 
Kunneman’s slow questions and the becoming aware of logopoiesis, thus also to become 
aware of all other parapoiesis. 
Pezze (2006) uses Heidegger’s work Country Path Conversations to illustrate a 
dialogue between a scientist29, a scholar30 and a teacher31 ensues on the nature of thinking, 
one that does not involve willing Pezze (2006) explains. The three interlocutors are searching 
for a “will-less thinking” (Lovitts, 1995, p.599) that will be explained as Gelassenheit. 
During this Conversation, each interlocutor gradually lets go of his own discourse while still 
interacting in a circular movement instead of a deductive reasoning. Due to the dialectic 
nature of a – loose – form of thinking among different thinking spaces, a new thinking space 
is allowed to emerge. Pezze calls this “the transforming transformation of our own way of 
thinking, which is forced to change in its core in order to be part of the scene settles by 
                                              
29 Able to think deductive and think in a representational model 
30 Able to philosophical think from within a metaphysical perspective 
31 The Heideggerian idea of a teacher 
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Heidegger” (Pezze, 2006, Conversation section, paragraph 5). The traditional way of thinking 
is subordinate to will and subjectivism. This means that all things and beings become 
subordinates to the subject that became the highest principle of Being (ibid). By questioning 
how thinking without will can be achieved, it beholds the essence of thinking as non-willing 
(Nicht-wollen) (Heidegger, 1966, p.58-59). The interlocutors are willing not to will so they 
can achieve a thinking without will, thus without position and subjectivity. Pezze (2006) 
explains that this stage needs to be done to get closer to Gelassenheit as it is a preparation for 
the final stage of releasement where we have left the sphere of willing behind altogether, 
where man, as with Eckhart, has no will at all (1990, p.171).  
By letting go of willing, an awakening of releasement in sense of keeping awake for 
releasement (Wachbleiben für die Gelassenheit) is made possible (Heidegger, 1966, p.61). 
This is not to be understood as Erwachen (an act to wake up Gelassenheit), but to have a non-
willing and open thinking so that the interlocutors are let into Gelassenheit. Pezze points out 
that the verb ‘lassen’ (give up something) may suggest a passiveness, but as the Conversation 
leads the reader on to experience Gelassenheit, it is rather to be considered ‘higher acting’ in 
the form of ‘waiting’32. In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger begins with the complaint that 
Man does not think principally enough on the nature of acting. Acting is only known as 
manipulating an operation. The reality of the Being is valued according to its usefulness, but 
the essence of acting is ‘accomplishment’. Heidegger describes accomplishment as to 
develop something into the fullness of his being, to bring forth in its fullest, producere 
(Heidegger, 2005, p.19). So, higher acting does not ask for action, but is a ‘higher’ acting due 
to accomplishment. It accomplishes by waiting to happen instead of willing to happen. To 
Heidegger, this accomplishment disposition is achievable through waiting, because waiting 
does not change possibilities but keeps them open (Heidegger, 1966, p.68). The moment we 
do think about what we are waiting for, we are not waiting anymore but expecting. What 
Heidegger is saying is that Gelassenheit escapes the moment we think about it. It is 
ungraspable, cannot be defined or even done. The truth of being, the Dasein, the essence of 
human nature, shows itself in being itself by a non-willing waiting attitude. This allows Man 
to be let-in into Gelassenheit. So waiting makes free of thinking in a representing mode. 
Waiting has no will to subject anything and thus it lets in the openness to Gelassenheit.  
                                              
32 This resonates with Daoism’s wei wu wei (act by not-acting). Not to be considered a passivity, but as active 
awareness and influencing by just being-there.  
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Being let-in Gelassenheit means to be let-in into Gegnet. Gegnet has no proper 
translation Pezze affirms, at best should be understood as a Region (that-which-regions) that 
“comes to meet us” (ibid, p.65). “Gegnet refers to the acting of Gegnet towards the being of 
Dasein. We could say that Gegnet is the essential movement that relates and determines a 
relation to the being of Dasein” (Pezze, 2006). To Heidegger, Gegnet is a verweilende Weite 
meaning to say that it a dwelling space without restrictions and as a distance. In Heidegger’s 
words, an enchanted region where everything belonging there returns to that in which it rests 
(Heidegger, 1966, p.65). So the Region is an abiding expanse in which things just ‘are’ 
without any means of Being. Pezze (2006) concludes that Gelassenheit means waiting, in the 
sense as she has previously described. By waiting, Man is in a true relation to Gegnet. A true 
relationship, Heidegger says, is one that what it relates to, can be to the fullest of its own 
Being without being held back by the one that it is relating to. Pezze (2006) calls upon two 
concepts: resolve to remain open to being and composed steadfastness where releasement 
rests in. With in-dwelling (Inständigkeit), they all belong to ‘authentic releasement’ in 
moving into near-ness of Being. Pezze concludes that “the task is that of being mindful and 
moving closer to that which is the closest to us, and because of this the farthest, that is, be-ing 
in its truth. Thinking the truth of be-ing is the task of thinking, and thus of man, that as 
“thinking being,” is called to “in-dwell into releasement to that-which-regions.” (2006, end 
section).  
The critique of Heidegger on anthropocentrism lies in the metaphysical and cognitive-
rational way of thinking of the Western philosophical discourse. And so, Heidegger 
attempted to find out a way to be able to enter Gegnet where Dasein is, but without the ability 
to define and grasp it. Peter Sloterdijk takes on Heidegger's criticism on humanism. For 
Sloterdijk, humanism has shown that it has failed, partly due to two World Wars in the 20th 
century and the waning of the Critical Theory. As conclusion Sloterdijk (1999) thinks that 
Man cannot be tamed with a humanism or a religion, but has to work on a codex of 
anthropotechniques. These human-ethical techniques are to be formulated before unethical 
acts of technologies may be executed on humans. The Rules for the Human Zoo is therefore a 
warning, not a plea for genetic selection and division of humans from superhumans.  
2.3 Sloterdijk’s Rules for the Human Zoo   
On July 20, 1999, philosopher Peter Sloterdijk gave a lecture at an academic congress in 
Elmau on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Sloterdijk came with his own reply letter to 
Heidegger's Letter on Humanism (1946). Sloterdijk's lecture and letter attempted to update 
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Heidegger's criticism of modern humanism in order to question the philosophy of its position 
vis-à-vis biotechnology and genetics. Sloterdijk’s letter for Heidegger further discusses the 
implications of current and future technical eras on humanism. Just like Heidegger, Sloterdijk 
(2009a) went through history to demonstrate the weaknesses of humanism as a literary 
training institute with the most important ones: that anthropocentrism and reason are the 
pillars of humanism. Humanism, to Sloterdijk, is the product of the transfers of good 
literature and wisdom from one generation to another that builds friendships. The Greeks 
passed on her texts to the Romans and the Romans passed it on to European civilizations. But 
in Roman times people had the 'civilized' culture, but also the 'beastly' culture in which 
gladiator fights and executions took place. Using written texts as means of communication 
gave the humanists an ability to distance themselves from dehumanizing acts. But humanism 
did not succeed, Sloterdijk believes. It simply is not enough anymore to try to achieve a tele-
communicative bond by writing, as professional as they may be, love-inspiring letters to a 
nation of friends (2005, p.22). Due to media in 1918 (radio) and after 1945 (television) and 
now the internet revolution Man has become post literary, post epistolary and therefore 
posthumanist. The era of modern humanism as a schooling and shaping model has ended 
because the illusion has become unattainable that large political and economic structures can 
be organized within the friendship model of the literary society (Sloterdijk, 2005, p.22). Who 
still tames the human being if humanism as a school of human consent fails? Sloterdijk 
(2005) asks. Sloterdijk therefore values Heidegger's call for a contemplative asceticism, but 
combats his religious, mystical and cryptic ambiguity (2009a). He quotes Heidegger in the 
part on replying to the third question of Beaufret, how can a sense be restored to the word 
‘humanism’? At this point, Sloterdijk reiterates Heidegger’s question, why should humanism 
and its general philosophical self-representation be seen as the solution for humanity, when 
the catastrophe of the present clearly shows that it is man himself, along with his systems of 
metaphysical self-improvement and self-clarification, that is the problem? (Sloterdijk, 2009c, 
p.17). Sloterdijk disagrees with Heidegger on the ontology of Being. To Sloterdijk, 
Heidegger mistakes how humans enter the clearing (Lichtung). Sloterdijk says, on one hand, 
a natural history of releasement (Gelassenheit) in which Man could become the animal and 
control the world and the other a social history of taming at which humans experienced 
themselves as beings that concentrated to answer the whole (2005, p.33). 
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2.3.1 Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
In Nietzsche’s most famous philosophical book Also sprach Zarathustra, Henk Manschot 
(n.d.) sees an interesting story in which the modern Man needs to be closer with the Earth by 
heading into the mountains. Feelings of fear, uncertainty, but also awe and exuberance [of 
nature] interexchange in this book. Nietzsche shows that modern Man is looking for a new 
spirituality, as God has ‘died’. In this story, a clochard comes forth who has undone himself 
from materialistic richness. A person who is free, but also feels ashamed of the greed of 
Mankind. 
Sloterdijk uptakes two historical discourses of humanity: 1. the anthropogenetic 
revolution in which man is born prematurely and is born with a surplus of beastly behavior 
and 2. domestication of the home builders of Language. The antropogenetic revolution is the 
biological birth of coming into the world. He would even to as far as to call the human the 
creature that failed in his animalhood and his animal-being (ibid). Man then falls out of 
‘Umwelt’ (milieu) and learns the world in an ontological way. This ‘dramatic’ birth and 
transfer of ownership to Being is the heritage humans have brought along. So, if a human is 
in-the-world, then it’s because he’s the product of a hyper birth that made him from infant to 
worldling. Without language, the house of Being, it would only bring forth psychotic 
animals. So, house builders of Language did help greatly to tame humans. But now that there 
are houses, people need to decide who get the house and who don’t. In other words, who 
decides for humanity which course to take? Sloterdijk also cites Nietzsche's book Also sprach 
Zarathustra. In that book the main character is surprised about the ever smaller human-
growing due to its educational humanism. To Zarathustra, Man has succeeded in taming 
humans’ wildness by using virtues, but it could not be possible with just humanistic 
educational means. The humanist horizon would never reach further than taming and 
educating, shackling Man to his self-imposed virtues. But behind the light horizon of the 
well-effective taming humanism, Nietzsche finds a second and darker horizon where humans 
are cultivated. The dark side of the clearing did not criticize the successful results of ethics 
and genetics of the human cultivation politics. Humans have been domesticated and made 
themselves pets by ones who are enforcing the cultivation politics. It has led to an 
unsuspecting separation between growers and cultivated people with specific cultivator-roles 
like priests and teachers (Sloterdijk, 1999, p.35-36). Nietzsche wishes to address those 
cultivators and create a new battleground of all kinds of cultivators and cultivation politics. 
Sloterdijk would frame it as the battle between humanists and superhumanists 
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(Übermenschen). Although Sloterdijk thinks Nietzsche may have exaggerated, Sloterdijk 
does think that “the discourse on discrimination and interweaving of taming and cultivating 
has validity. Also the twilight awareness on human production and in more general terms: 
antropotechniques. The current thinking cannot turn away unless it wants to surrender to 
innocence.” (ibid, p.38). What Sloterdijk warns for is that people are increasingly falling into 
either ‘active’ or the ‘subjective’ side of selection. As a result of this essay, Sloterdijk calls 
for "actively playing the game of Zarathustra and to formulate a codex of anthropological 
techniques" (ibid, p.39). “Such a codex would change the meaning of classic humanism 
because not only humanitas would mean friendship of human with Man, but implicitly and 
now increasingly explicitly imply that the human has become the higher power for Man.” 
(ibid, p.40). With anthropotechniques are meant physical and mental techniques where people 
work on themselves. In that respect, religions are for Sloterdijk (2011) mere - spiritual – 
anthropotechniques where man does not find God again, but finds forgotten parts of the self, 
of the human nature. Sloterdijk takes Plato’s royal anthropotechnique as example: the 
shepherd would not be someone who herds by popularity vote, or inherited privileges nor 
assumptions. He would be a statesman who would be able to most efficiently interweave the 
most favorable qualities of free controllable people for his society, so that the human zoo 
would achieve optimal self-regulation. For humanists, their task would be to have one 
suprahumanist who would plan the characteristics of an elite group of people who on behalf 
of all other humanists would be cultivated (ibid, p. 45). Some German intelligentsia read 
Sloterdijk's lecture carelessly and immediately assumed an undemocratic discrimination 
against people on the basis of genetics. A plea for a Nietzschean separation between people 
and Übermenschen was assumed. The German intelligentsia immediately criticized 
Sloterdijk's warning as an argument for the cultivation and breeding of genetically 
qualitatively better people. This is called eugenics or breed improvement. Jürgen Habermas, 
one of the great thinkers of the Marxist Frankfurter Schule and figurehead of the Critical 
Theory would have encouraged his journalist friends to accuse Sloterdijk of "authentic 
facism" sophistry (Sloterdijk, 1999, 153). Sloterdijk, like Heidegger and Nietzsche, had to be 
put away as their thoughts were considered dangerous philosophical domains as so to protect 
the Critical Theory and humanism. 
2.3.2 A never-ending acceleration of kinetic politics 
The Sloterdijk-Habermas affair ironically proved to be an example of the hyper morality of 
the Critical Theory that Sloterdijk denounced. The philosophers of Critical Theory, with the 
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image of 'the intellectual type as the watchman of the public sphere' had perverse incentives 
to hold on to power and in this case to raised public alarms through journalists (Vollmer, 
2009, p. 104). Sloterdijk argued against an indifference about the developments of 
anthropotechniques in an era in which humans can work with (gene) technology themselves. 
In addition, the affair itself was an expression of the oblivion disputed by Heidegger that the 
essence of man was already determined by these humanisms, without questioning whether 
the interpretations of these humanisms were correct or not. The blackguarding critics of the 
Critical Theory in the Sloterdijk-affair have therefore ironically proven the danger of being 
the active side of Zarathustra’s game. Blinded by their own dogmatism, modern Frankfurter 
philosophy could not see otherwise than its self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, modern philosophy 
is mobilizing itself to move further and faster. Sloterdijk juxtaposed the kinetics of modern 
planetary mobilization metaphorically in an ever-present moving forward car-driving towards 
the false instrumental truth of continuously creating more motion. In the book Eurotaoism 
(1991) Sloterdijk writes that modernity is characterized by mobility kinetics. It is a kinetics, a 
movement theory, where modern Man and his capital goods must be able to mobilize 
immediately, accompanied by an unprecedented and an ever-growing haste. This dynamic 
brings progress and chaos, says Sloterdijk: 
We must assume that in the very risky accelerations of our time, something is 
accomplished. Something that is from us and is close to us, read: something what we 
want. If that is true, then a critical theory of the society becomes impossible – because 
there would be no left distinction between the critique and the criticized unless the 
critique first thinks against itself. It will have to subjugate the ownness, the closeness 
and the self-wanted to a research. (Sloterdijk, 1991, p.14) 
To counter this acceleration, Sloterdijk would call upon Daoism to slow down this 
mobilization with silent criticism (ibid). Sloterdijk uses the theme of 'birth' in his books 
Spheres and Eurotaoism. For Sloterdijk, birth means that people have already been received 
in the safe womb. That means that Man always seeks a unity with his environment. Without 
his environment, Man has no meaning. So, according to Sloterdijk (1991), Heidegger’s 
Dasein needs to be born into the world. Then comes the 'drama of birth' that puts Man in a 
less safe space. Through metaphysics, technology and culture, Man subjects himself to 
immune spheres, spaces, to protect himself and to give meaning to this world. These spheres 
are broadened from microspheres to macrospheres. A space of family, of a country, of 
religion, and ultimately also of the universe. By equating man with God, it could not be 
 45 
otherwise than that God would eventually be replaced by man (2009b, p.15-16). As a result, 
the paternalistic overarching and structured sphere differs into individual spheres next to and 
alongside each other. In the section Foam of Sloterdijk’s book Spferen, Sloterdijk endeavors 
to find out the rules for the human zoo with this liberation from metaphysics. 
Sloterdijk thinks that Mankind has forgotten how he was born in the world. Modern 
Man knows no rest and has also forgotten the Earth as a carrier. It is only possible that man 
has forgotten himself and is uprooted by himself. Sloterdijk therefore sees, inspired by 
Heidegger, the man rather than being hurried. With Eckhart's concept of Gelassenheit 
Sloterdijk refers to what Heidegger called letting the beings be. Via the Dominican 
theologian and mystic Eckhart von Hochheim (ca. 1260-1328) Heidegger finds an 
opportunity for non-conceptual, non-metaphysical thinking that he, later, will relate to in 
Eastern thought. 
 
2.4 Meister Eckhart 
Otto Pöggeler, a German philosopher specialized in Heidegger, wrote an essay West-East 
Dialogue in 1990: Heidegger and Lao-tzu about the similarities between Heidegger's 
thinking and the Chinese philosophy of Daoism. Otto Pöggeler begins with the introduction 
of Dominican mysticist or philosopher33 Meister Eckhart (1260-1328). Meister Eckhart's 
mysticism is currently quite popular among Christians and Buddhists due to his theological 
thinking for the current interreligious dialogue on Multiple Religious Belonging (identifying 
yourself or belonging to multiple religions) and his thinking about unity spirituality34. Meister 
Eckhart did not criticize humanism directly, since the Enlightment humanism did not exist 
until the 18th century. However, Eckhart  
2.4.1 Divine unification  
For Eckhart, God's birth or divine union does not mean an event in a certain time and space, 
but this unity of God and man means an infinite dynamic where God gives birth in the soul of 
man (Vlieger, 2014). Eckhart distinguishes between the divine perspective that is eternal and 
the human perspective that is temporarily and operates constantly in a reflective way. 
According to Eckhart, divine reality can be seen as a dimension to which the individual is 
                                              
33 Scholars do not agree whether Meister Eckhart is a mysticist or a philosopher. Jeremiah Hackett defined 
Eckhart as an “original hermeneutical thinker in the Latin tradition”. Hackett, J. (Ed.). (2012). A Companion to 
Meister Eckhart. (pp. xxiii). Brill.   
34 dominicanen.nl, 2014 
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concerned, but as soon as Man realizes that he is experiencing that dimension, that experience 
is no longer valid for an experience that is placed by man between other experiences (Vlieger, 
2014). When Man realizes in his human reflective attitude that he is experiencing God, then 
Man returns to a relationship with God and is - again - detached from the oneness with God. 
Therefore, the divine reality for Eckhart is not a unification between the divine and human 
perspective, but a dynamic and fleeting union with God that immediately decays when man 
realizes that he experiences that oneness with God. According to Eckhart, it is therefore not 
possible to experience the divine reality with conscious, but it is possible to express that 
reality in us by being receptive (Vlieger, 2014). Philosopher and phenomenologist Gerard 
Visser (2008) describes two attitudes to stand before God: self-will and resignation. Self-will 
is an attitude in which you take God as being outside and in front of you and resignation is an 
attitude of perfect inner peace in which you let go of the first attitude and open up to the inner 
self as the only place where God himself can reveal himself (Visser, 2010, p.197).  
2.4.2 Eckhart’s gelassenheit  
For Eckhart, an attitude in which the human perspective is released by not judging or 
reflecting on our - sensory, emotional, spiritual - perceptions, but by accepting them without 
having to understand or know why it is happening. This attitude is a core element in 
Heidegger's criticism of humanism. Man must not fill in reality and give meaning to it, but 
consider unity with God - or reality as it is present for us now and here - as it already exists. 
Vlieger (2014) emphasizes that this passive attitude does not mean that there are no 
performances, desires or goals, but that the fixation on all these things is left loose. If you 
relate wrongly to those things, then you cannot help but become unhappy:  
The people who seek peace in external things, be it in places or in ways, in people or 
in work, in the foreign or in poverty or in humiliation - however impressive or 
whatever it is, everything is nevertheless nothing and gives no peace. (Eckhart, 1979, 
p.56)  
In this quote it becomes clear that with a self-will a peace outside the self is sought. One 
cannot find peace by going to places or rituals, no matter how beautiful and wonderful they 
are. Such a person comes with the expectation to find peace and because this is outside of 
himself, he will not find it. Peace has to be experienced in the person and we do that by being 
left alone, says Eckhart (Maurice, 2009). That does not mean adopting an indifferent attitude, 
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but being open to the things that are near and to act on what makes you move. Eckhart 
explains this as follows:  
Indeed, if a man thinks he will get more of God by meditation, by devotion, by 
ecstasies, or by special infusion of grace than by the fireside or in the stable -that is 
nothing but taking God, wrapping a cloak round His head and shoving Him under a 
bench. (…) And so, if you were to ask a genuine man who acted from his own ground, 
'Why do you act?' if he were to answer properly he would simply say, 'I act because I 
act.' (Maurice, 2009, Sermon 13, p.110) 
For Heidegger, Eckhart's way of thinking about resignation was interesting, because Eckhart 
suggested a mystical but non-conceptual non-metaphysical way of thinking. This way of 
looking at the world would be purer and closer to reality than the images and meanings that 
people put on (Heidegger, 2005). As mentioned in section 2.2.3, Heidegger therefore makes 
an attempt to replace the metaphysics of humanity for an ontology of being human.  
Heidegger refers to Eckhart and Lao Zi, but does so within the context of their ways of 
thinking. In this, Heidegger and Eckhart differ from each other on how gelassenheit is to be 
understood. Jellema (2010) defines Eckhart as a theist who viewed gelassenheit in an infinite 
dynamic unity dimension of Man and God. Heidegger (2010), from a philosophical 
perspective, could not take over this definition of gelassenheit as religious notions may pose 
metaphysical basis. Heidegger sees gelassenheit as an exercise to let being be, thus let Being 
come forth as a phenomenon that shows itself in Gegnet (Pezze, 2008). Dasein is for 
Heidegger a human being that exists only in our temporality. Thus, for Heidegger the lived 
experience (Erlebnis) is an expression of rational thoughts in that temporality (in Livingston, 
n.d.). For Heidegger, Erleben refers to experiencing the lived moment with heart and soul 
before the human perspective gives meaning and language to it. Heidegger's thought can then 
be called an existential or hermeneutic phenomenology. Phenomenology is a philosophical 
movement and qualitative science that not only relies on human cognitive abilities, but also 
on our essential, physical, emotional, intuitive experiences in reality (Van Manen, 2005). 
Phenomenology seeks as close as possible to the origin of the pre-reflexive dimensions of 
human existence. Heidegger was therefore looking for a philosophical thinking in which the 
lived reality and not the conceived metaphysics of people were central.  
Thanks to the correspondence between Beaufret and Heidegger, many philosophers 
have once again been inspired to study Heidegger's works and to comment on them. 
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Heidegger's essay On humanism led to a renewed critical philosophical reflection of being 
human by re-evaluating the subject-object dichotomy, followed by many discussions and 
sometimes heated debates. Heidegger, Sloterdijk, Eckhart and Daoism have close similarities 
and are relational to each other. Together, they have criticized the anthropocentric perspective 
through anti-metaphysical means. Traditional Western philosophy thought man purely as an 
animal rationale. From that perspective, it is logical to put people at the heart of Being right. 
However, rules and laws conceived by logos cannot approximate the essence of being human, 
the ethos, because the ratio approaches it in a metaphysical way. Man decides what man is by 
his logos. Humanism thus creates and tames man instead of considering what the essence of 
man is, according to the previous authors. The technological way of speaking via the 
usefulness of objects and actions is a shortage of Being. It is also a shortage of Tao as Daoism 
considers normativity to abberate from Tao. Man disregards what is closest to him, namely: 
to regard his understanding of his actions, to be on the road to. Being there as an attentively 
resigned attitude. Heidegger's and Taoist criticism can then be interpreted as a shift from 
analytical thinking to sensory, spiritual and experiential associative thinking. In doing so, it 
leads to a spiritual connection with the environment.  
Chapter 3 Naturalistic Daoism and humanistic Confucianism 
Patricia de Martelaere wrote in her book Taoïsme, de weg om niet te volgen35 (2006, p.11) 
that someone should be familiar with at least three or four Chinese research areas or practices 
to understand Daoism. He must have internalized these areas in order to understand Daoism: 
1. to be able to read Daoist texts, one must know and understand the Chinese - cultural and 
discourse language, 2. a philosophical education or at least familiarity with philosophical 
questions and concepts, 3. practicing at least some form of meditation or inner training to 
realize what Daoist principles like wei wu-wei (doing by not doing) mean and 4. an 
elementary knowledge of Chinese medicine. The latter is seldom or only briefly mentioned 
by sinologists, scholars and historians because Chinese medicine, besides meditation, Tai Chi 
Chuan and respiratory doctrine Qi Gong are considered crucial praxis of Daoism but Chinese 
medicine as a product of Daoism. They are technical actions to attune with the Dao using the 
body and mind. Little is known about the relationship between Daoism and Chinese 
medicine, because it has so far not been referred to by an acknowledgment of sources with 
accurate historical dating (De Martelaere, 2006, p.21). Thanks to a recent translation of the 
                                              
35 Daoism, The Way Not to Follow 
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latest classical text Nei Ye (Inner Training), there now seems to be better evidence that Daoist 
praxis are acts for a lived philosophy of the body (ibid). De Martelaere (2006) also gives two 
warnings before studying traditional Chinese thought. It has a dynamic character that often 
fails to intervene and has a contextual interaction. Characteristics of Daoism can transform, 
evolve and always have a counterpart. This is illustrated by the more familiar Yin and Yang 
principle. Yin and Yang are the two philosophical and energetic manifestations that arise from 
Qi. Qi is in turn a representative part of the comprehensive Tao (Maciocia, 1989). The second 
problem with Chinese thinking is that it remains 'practical' in the broad sense of 'praxis'. 
Traditional Chinese thought tried to elaborate universal principles that could control the body 
– on micro level - and the land – on macro level -, practically in a medical and strategic way 
(De Martelaere, 2008). Fairly all Chinese philosophies and traditions have attempted to find 
universal principles that could be acted upon on individual to all higher levels. So, the 
question remains whether Chinese thinking can be called a philosophy and whether praxis 
prefers a different and incomprehensible non-rational language. With examples, imagery and 
passages I hope to give an idea of what is meant by specific Daoist concepts such as Tao, wu 
wei and ziran. 
3.1 Daoism and Confucianism   
All world religions have at some time made their appearance in the history of China like 
Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism. But prior to all these world religions, 
the Chinese had their own traditions, mostly noted Daoism and Confucianism. The world's 
religions and indigenous philosophies were regarded as learning paths that contained wisdom 
about arts of living, politics and spiritual (self)-care (De Martelaere, 2006). For this reason, 
the Chinese did not see these learning paths optional offers, but as joint paths that each could 
reveal pieces of wisdom in their own ways. Daoism and Confucianism have a unique 
relationship because both originated around 350 BCE and have always been each other’s 
continuing polars.  
3.1.1 Daoism  
In China, Daoism has influenced these world religions to a greater or lesser extent; the most 
characteristic for the West is a branch of Indian Buddhism, which under the influence of 
Daoism has developed into Chan Buddhism, which we now know better as Zen Buddhism 
(Ransdorp, 2007, p.10; Schipper, 1988, p.12). To date, it is not clear whether the founder of 
Daoism Lao Zi actually lived or that he was a compilation of written wisdoms, compiled in 
the book Tao Te Ching. Professor of Modern Literature at the University of Utrecht Maarten 
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van Buuren thinks that the Tao Te Ching is not a compilation, but must be written by a single 
author because it has an affectionate stream-lined style that speaks about the poems in its text 
(Van Buuren, 2011, 0:08:18-0:09:29). De Martelaere thinks is more likely the case that it was 
a compilation now that the translated basic text Nei Ye (Inner Training) is dated 350 BCE by 
Roth and Kirkland. If so, the Tao Te Ching, the Daoist Book on the Way and the Force 
cannot be older than 350 BCE (De Martelaere, 2006, p.34). That could implicate that Daoism 
did not come up with Confucianism at the same time, but rather is a reaction to 
Confucianism. In the complete writings of Zhuang Zi, Confucius appears as the adversary of 
Daoism and in Confucian texts Confucius turns against anti-social individualism, but he is 
positive about Daoist principles such as 'inaction' (wu wei) (Schipper, 2014, p.8). 
By the end of the Zhou Dynasty (1050- 256 BC), seven Chinese nations were fighting 
each other in the bloody Warring States Period (475-221 BC). The decline of the Zhou 
dynasty brought social and political unrest that would lead to an era of The Hundred Schools 
of Thought (770-221 BC). During this period several philosophical traditions arose that tried 
to confront this unrest. In the historical work Shiji by the Han dynasty-official Sima Qian, 
Confucianism, legalism, Daoism, Yin-Yang school, Mohism and the school of Namur are 
recorded as the most prominent Chinese traditions of that time. Confucius (551-479 BC) and 
Lao Zi lived in the time of the loss of the Zhou dynasty. Daoism is opposed to Confucianism 
as an antithesis, with its main arguments that Confucianism only knows the Tao of people. 
For Confucianism, humanity is the best way to cultivate humanity in relation to others. That 
must lead to a peaceful society in which man becomes fully human through self-cultivation. 
Daoism, however, states that by absolutizing morality a fixation arises on fellow humanity 
and virtue. This fixation leads away from the Tao, the Road, whereby people with active 
intervention behavior do more harm than good for the harmony and processes of life and the 
Tao (Schipper, 2007. Schipper, 2010. Delaune, 2015. De Martelaere, 2006). To Daoism, 
humans should be considered individuals and uncategorial. Feelings such as love, dedication, 
loyalty, humanity, righteousness are spontaneous in our Being, if they are not. They are 
useless (Schipper, 2010, p.198). This spontaneity refers to the concept of ziran, more on this 
in paragraph 3.3.2.  
3.1.2 Jesuits 
Thanks to the reports of the Jesuits, philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) 
became inspired by Confucianism, because this 'natural theology' of China was very 
reminiscent of Christianity. The Jesuits came to China as missionaries in the sixteenth 
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century to proclaim Christianity there. Fathers Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and Michele 
Ruggiere (1543-1607) first became acquainted with Confucianism. They began to participate 
in Chinese culture and its Confucian practices and rituals. Ricci's notes were later worked out 
by missionary Nicolas Trigault (1577-1628) (Gallagher in Schipper, 2014, p.87). In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Confucianism became more and more familiar, so that 
European thinkers such as Voltaire may have been inspired by Confucianism during the 
development of enlightened humanism (Schipper, 2014 p.92). To Voltaire, Confucianism was 
a rational form of social order as opposed to Christianity, because it did not appear to have 
religious aspects. But Voltaire was mistaken in the motives of Confucianism as 
Enlightenment thinking. Confucianism was not based on principles of Enlightenment 
thinking, but on social behavior and rituals that promoted and guarded humanity (Froese, 
2006). Following the example of the Chinese examination system for civil servants 
meritocratically devised by Confucius; countries as Prussia, England and France followed 
with an examination system for senior officials (Schipper, 2014). This is one of the reasons 
why Schipper (2014) believes that Confucianism has secretly become one of the building 
blocks of the Western Enlightenment. No evidence of this has been found in humanist 
literature. Perhaps European humanism then concentrated on its own discourse after a 
negative turnaround in the consideration of ‘useless’ Chinese non-philosophy and culture just 
before the Opium Wars. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) dismissed 
Confucianism as a useless moral philosophy (in Schipper, 2014, p.98) and the Jesuits tried to 
transform Confucianism into an exclusively Christian-Confucian orthodoxy that did not 
tolerate other ideologies (ibid.). As a result, Confucianism has lost its humanistic character, 
becoming a means for political strategic use.  
3.1.3 Confucianism  
By gaining inspiration from the early years of the Zhou Dynasty and Chinese antiquity, 
Confucius developed a political and also a humanistic philosophy in which ren (仁) is usually 
translated as humanity or virtue as the highest principle. The Chinese character is composed 
of human (人) and two (二). This principle is thus based on a horizontal relationship between 
two people. Confucius applied this principle of reciprocity to five human relationships (wu 
lun): 1. respect and loyalty between BCE and servant, 2. goodness and obedience between 
parent and child, 3. intimacy, 4. tolerance and division of tasks between husbands and wives, 
5. loving care and togetherness between brothers and other relatives and trust between friends 
(Schipper, 2014, p.13). By following these five relations, ren would be expressed. Humanity 
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and virtue are the two cardinal principles that arise in Confucian thinking in which sympathy, 
empathy and compassion are central (Weiming et al, 2011). Ren then means being able to 
identify yourself with your neighbors (in Schipper, 2014, p.57). There is also the essence of 
Confucius' famous statement:  
Zigong asked, is there a single word that you can take your life as a principle for what 
you do? The Master said, That is charity. What you yourself do not want to undergo, 
do not do that to others either. (Schipper, 2014, p.56) 
Confucius calls the character of ren measure and middle are the highest of human nature 
(Jaspers, 1960, p.101). For Confucius this meant that a person becomes a human being only 
by cultivating and practicing. Ren is the essence of Man that is always near Man. Ren, 
however, should not be seen as an inner morality, but is only found during an active 
experience with human relationships, out-of-the-self dialogue and through exchange in 
society (Weiming & Ikeda, 2011). Every human being is thus a social being who is related to 
others and that is best expressed through virtues and rituals. People also had to educate and 
cultivate so that they could show moral and ethical behavior. There are three main issues: 1. 
childlike piety (respect for family and hierarchy) 2. humanity and 3. (li) rituals, but also laws, 
ceremonies, rules of conduct can be understood as li. Li is the ritual expression of norms in 
the context of right and civilized behavior in relationship forms. By li, the true emotions of an 
educated person are expressed and thereby strengthen the own inner strength (de) (Fingarette 
in Schipper, 2014, p.61). In addition, reprocity in li ensured social order in society. 
For Schipper, it is unmistakable that original Confucianism must be regarded as one of the 
most important humanistic and ethical philosophies of life in history. Professor of Chinese 
History and Philosophy and Confucian Studies at Harvard University Tu Weiming also 
believes that new Confucianism as an extended and inclusive humanism can yield better 
welfare for people than the secular humanism of Enlightenment thinking (Weiming & Ikeda, 
2011). As a Confucian humanism it can present an anthropocosmic holistic view in which 
interrelations exist from a union with Heaven, people and the Earth that calls for self-
cultivation at all levels. In paragraph 2.1.2 Anthropocosmos, the anthropocosmic unity 
principle in Neo-Confucianism was proposed by Tu Weiming. In Inquiry on the Great 
learning, Wang Yangming (1472-1529) emphasized that the ontological power of people to 
sympathize with Heaven, Earth and tens of thousands of things is a human-defining 
characteristic (ibid, p.246). On the basis of a number of examples, Wang makes it clear that 
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sympathy (the essence of Man) becomes an embodiment with the Other. An example of this 
is that people cannot get away from the heavy and dirty feeling when they see the fear of an 
animal that is slaughtered. "The [ren] is not a romantic ideal of unity, but a differentiated 
concept of connectedness" (ibid, p.247). 
3.2 Tao and Te  
The first two sentences of chapter 1 of the Tao Te Ching, literally "The Book of Tao and Te, 
by Lao Zi goes as follows: The eternal Tao cannot be expressed in words. The eternal name 
cannot be called (Schipper, 2010, p.23). Perhaps the most fundamental feature of Daoism is 
that there is an absence of definitions (Schipper, 1988, p.13). Confucius has as a teaching that 
all things and people must use the correct name: A lord must be a lord and a servant a 
servant; a father must be a father and a son a son. (in Schipper, 2010, p.22). This imposes 
certain roles and identities on people that they fulfill in a society. The former two sentences 
of the Tao Te Ching are a critique of this Confucian doctrine. Names do not matter, because 
names do not define what they are, but what they have to be - in a created and thus artificial 
culture. Daoism therefore thinks that culture and etymology makes people stray from the Tao 
and the inner strength Te. 
3.2.1 Tao 
In Chinese thinking, wisdom is focused on discovering a praxis of good and wise life. 
Western philosophy is focused on the discovery of truth from metaphysics, so that there is 
more importance in determining definitions. For example, an atom as a category is referred to 
as the starting point of the origin of the universe. But Tao does not have a fixed definition or 
category and must be understood as a cosmic principle that is omnipresent both inside and 
outside us. Tao is described by Schipper (2007, p.24) as the 'way' of nature, of 'heaven and 
earth' in all its aspects, in the cosmic energies of the stars and of the nature around us, but the 
Tao is also all-embracing so that it escapes every definition. Chapter 1 of Lao Zi (Appendix 
A) states that Tao is the path between 'being' and 'non-being', 'the nameless' and the 
'mentioned'. Schipper (2010) tries to describe Tao as an omnipresent (immanent) quality of 
'nothing' as well as of 'something'. Van Buuren (2011, 0:28:48-0:32:16) explains Tao in four 
meanings: 1. the literal and figurative guides, 2. the Way to follow, 3. the Universal Order 
that includes the Cosmos, Earth and us in continuous movements and rhythms and 4. a 
fundamental tone that man has to tune in with his own tone, going back to the origin 'the 
Void'. In Lao Zi's poetic thinking, Tao means correctly spoken, or authentic, which is closer 
to Heidegger's explanation of the Tao and Sein. In chapter 25 (Appendix B) of Lao Zi it is 
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explained that Tao does not travel a linear path, but makes a circularly recurring movement. 
Because Tao cannot be completely defined in human language, a river is often used as a 
metaphor to describe the dynamics of Tao. Tao is perhaps best described as a harmonious 
auto-regulatory mishmash of natural, spontaneous, immanent and latent things of different 
things that work together as influential elements and where there is no solid truth to be found. 
In short, the way of nature. On the one hand Tao is the beginning of everything, the Mother, 
but on the other hand the opposite, the Empty (Schipper, 2010, p.9). Resonance with the Way 
(Tao) is then resigned to the circular flow of all these things that comprise the Daoist Heaven 
and Earth. The Tao cannot be recorded in the human language, but can only be described. 
And unlike the Greek philosopher who sees 'the One' from the outside, the Chinese 
philosopher sees all patterns of the cosmos by staying with 'the One' within. This is 
elaborated in chapter 42 of the Tao Te Ching: ‘The Tao produces the One. One produces two. 
Two produces three. And three brings forth the ten thousand things’ (in De Martelaere, p.33). 
The 'One' is the original state of undivided energy (Qi). From this Qi, manifestations arise, 
disperse and aggregate that express themselves in lighter Yang elements (Heaven) and 
heavier Yin phase (the Earth). The interactions between these elements lead to the third, a 
tangible form of existence including Man and ten thousand things (Kaltenburg in De 
Martelaere, 2006, p.144). However, this should not be regarded as a chronological timeline, 
but as a nucleus that expands and that interactions between different manifestations of Qi that 
dynamically leads to manifestations of people, animals, plants, the earth, the cosmos, and so 
forth, that take place between those spheres. It can be compared to a mountain of Lego blocks 
(Tao) that interact with each other (Te) by two main interacting forces (Yin and Yang) and 
from that, as some point, the human being and the Ten Thousand Things materialize. Thus, 
Daoist thinking requires a relational but dynamic thinking. And so, Tao seems to resonate 
with Heidegger's Sein and the logos of Heraclitus. 
3.2.2 Te, an inner force against moral values 
The Daoist Te was described as moral virtue by Confucian commentators and this incorrect 
translation is also usually found in Western literature on Daoism. Schipper (2010) explains 
that the Confucianist understanding of Tao (way) and Te (virtue) were used as power 
principles in Confucianism. The mandate of Confucian Heaven (as Supreme Being) was only 
given if the emperor had great virtue and had to do so through the way of moral principles 
such as humanity and justice. Another Confucian translation of Te is 'acquired life force', one 
that can also be transferred as power of ancestor to future generations. But in Daoism Te is 
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‘an inspiration of the cosmic matter Qi’ (Schipper, 2010), an inner force that comes from 
within the body. It is rather a given natural force such as the healing power of eucalyptus 
against colds. Therefore, it can be seen as the effect of Tao in us that was given to us before 
birth (ibid). Perhaps it can then be described as the essence or characteristics of Tao that is 
expressed from our inner self. So, with lack of a better description, there is a given inspiration 
of the body by Tao that expresses Man in his authenticity when he is harmonized with Tao. 
 De Martelaere (2006) notes that in Daoism a distinction is made between Te as an 
energetic force (virtue) and humanity as a moral virtue. Humanity as an artificial virtue is 
rejected and seen as a degeneration of the loss of Tao and Te. In the first place, it is a reaction 
against Confucian’s shackling norms but secondly a deeper reaction against any human 
opinion on moral intervention whether it is motivated by social conventions or on the ‘true’ 
nature of Man. To Lao Zi, moral values are substitutes to a lost original and natural purity (of 
Tao and Te). For example, fishes do not need to worry about loving each other. They are 
provided for by the river and can therefore just Be (harmonized with the Tao). People who 
advocate humanity strongly are compared by Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi to fishes on a dried 
riverbed who are trying to wet each other with their saliva (Watson in De Martelaere, p.112). 
To Lao Zi, not only are moral values misleading, inefficient and consequences of dire need, 
but humanity and righteousness also cause more harm than good (ibid, p.113). Daoism’s 
critique on the Confucian way of culture is that humanity becomes the norm at which a 
human is valued (ibid). Zhuang Zi badinages hyperactive practitioners of the Tao who try 
their hardest to harmonize their Qi and try too hard to become one with the Tao (ibid, p.118). 
They have not turned down their ruler, humanity and rule of becoming one with the Tao and 
thus are shackled by this self-imposed rule. This has been a recurring criticism in Chapter two 
by western philosophers. Now we see it that in Daoism, criticism on aspects of humanism 
and anthropocentrism has existed long before. The Daoist who does not have the intention to 
be moral, appears to be a much more efficient ‘caregiver’ than the activist who wants to care 
and the sentimentalist who cries for the fate of his brother (ibid). In Daoist perspective, 
energy is lost in human ambitions, actions and emotions. The wise (Daoist) cares for Ten 
Thousand things not because of what he does, but because of what he is. Like the sun, it does 
not give life. Life becomes due to the presence of the sun. Fishes do not worry about water, 
they are provided with water by the river they live in. Therefore, the moral act of a Daoist 
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should be to cultivate Te (inner strength36) in others. The point of moral act in Daoism is not 
calculation or carefulness, but cultivating Te of the Tao from inside others so that people can 
let manifestations of Qi harmonious be what they are and let these manifestations not be 
treated as merely things (Watson & Palmer in De Martelaere, p.121). In letting manifestations 
‘naturally’ be and be cultivated, authentic life is expressed.  
3.3 Wei wu wei and ziran 
Being in harmony and coming into harmony with the Tao is a Daoist basic principle to 
(continue to) manifest the given life force. Being one with nature is according to Lao Zi 
achieved by wu wei (inaction). The principle of wu wei seems to be a paradoxical 
impossibility or useless activity because Tao is not possible to be reached. Tao is already in 
every person and so searching for Tao does not make any sense. What exactly does wu wei 
mean? Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, an author in the field of Zen and Shin Buddhism, (in 
Sorajjakool, 2001, p.80) warns that non-action (wu wei) should not be approached 
dualistically nor as passivity. Wu wei should also not be explained as doing nothing or 
indifferently, but as doing something by doing nothing (Schipper, 2010). It is like sailing with 
the wind in the back and the shadow of a tree looking up against the too bright sun. It is a 
spontaneous (ziran) action that comes naturally from the inner self (Sorajjakool, 2001) which 
is also shown in the parable of the cook Ding (Appendix C). Wu wei therefore refers to an 
authentic non-acting act in which the balance between and in all influences of the Tao is kept 
and restored. Schipper explains it as a formula: looking for the source of inner strength out of 
love and respect for life in yourself (2010, p.13). Wu wei is achieved by being constantly 
aware and responsive to Tao. The word ziran (自然) appears in Chapters 17, 23, 25 and 51 of 
the Tao Te Ching and is translated37 as spontaneity or naturalness, in some translations it is 
translated as ‘core nature’. It is comprised of the words zi (自) (self, oneself, from, naturally) 
and ran (然) (correct, right, so). Specifically, there is no English equivalent to this word and 
spontaneity does not fully cover ziran either. It is better understood as the core essence of 
yourself, which if harmonized with Tao, you are ‘being yourself’. It is like seeing the 
spontaneous genuine laugh of someone in an activity who is not aware of others and thus 
                                              
36 Perhaps authenticity although I am not yet convinced I can use that word. In Heideggerian words, I would like 
to implicate that the moral act of the Daoist is to help others to Be and does this by Being himself. The practical 
act would be to influence a situation so that an equilibrium of all influences in that particular situation are in 
harmony like cutting meat fluently between bones in the parable of Cook Ding.  
37 www.britannica.com/topic/ziran 
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neither himself are observing his laugh. But the moment he becomes aware, the laugh starts 
to look less genuine, suppressed by human normativity.  
3.3.1 Wu wei  
Sorajjakool (2001) translates wu wei as non-being. He points out that if non-being is the 
reason why things move in the phenomenological world, then Being in the world rejects us 
from harmonizing with the Tao. Sorajjakool (2001) links that to Heidegger's philosophy in 
his summary of Being and Time: people are constantly searching for being human, Dasein. 
By being in the world, this means being aware and being aware of the temporality of Being. 
This means that man has to hurry to the future because it realizes that Being is only 
temporary because of an inevitable death and that Being has no permanent basis (Green in 
Sorajjakool, 2001, p.81). A debt by dasein is experienced and that brings uncertain feelings in 
people because he knows that he is removed from his authentic life. He is not what he should 
be. Due to this guilt, being the real authenticity of itself. To feel guilt also means that Being 
knows that something transcends. So through guilt people become aware of their non-union 
with Being. The disappearance of Being makes people insecure and makes them look for 
'care'. Through care, man hopes to reach unity with Being again, but then one must know 
what is Being. Through conscience man tries to reconcile with guilt. Man constructs 
knowledge about God and thereby the criteria of good and evil to purify the conscience. In 
His and Time the conclusion is that the I, through the guilty conscience, tries to make 
something real of itself, out of the fear that it will otherwise be nothing (Macquarrie in 
Sorajjakool, 2001, p.82). Making criteria to make Being more true than non-being means, 
however, that distinctive categories arise where one (Yin) can no longer be - with - another 
(Yang). Spontaneity (ziran) can no longer exist because Man subjects himself to a cultural 
behavior within a normative framework. It is like a spontaneous young child with an open 
mind who is no longer allowed to do anything, because that specific and authentic action does 
not fit in a desirable category. As a result, people will impose their will on nature instead of 
following it (Kohn in Sorajjakool, 2001, p.83). Man and Confucianism try to explain with 
their will what natural things should do. It is like saying how the sun shines, from the human 
perspective, with these colors and from this time until this time. Or saying that beauty is 
good, but ugliness is bad. This is how man should be, with these moral virtues and these 
things good and that those things are wrong. This way, when dasein is approached by 
humanists and Confucians, the Tao is completely lost because one cannot do without the 
other and the sun shines because it is ‘spontaneously itself' (ziran). The colors just exist, but 
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it is Man who gives meaning and associates these colors, resulting in rituals and covenants on 
how to act knowing how the sun is supposed to shine. By considering yu (Being) as desirable, 
man tries to avoid wu (Nothing). According to Sorajjakool (2001), two problems follow from 
this. The first problem is not following wu means not following nature. Man wants to be 
something and not be nothing, but nature (Tao) is yu (Being) and wu (Nothing) together. Yin 
and Yang. It is a one-sided view that leads to the second problem: by only following yu 
(Being) constantly, an ever greater awareness of wu (Nothing) arises. That realization leads to 
a fear that, in turn, strives even more for yu. Daoism fundamentally critiques this Confucian – 
and humanist – virtue, suggesting it leads to a downward spiral thinking where Confucianists 
will not be able to rest in an ever-seeking Being.  
3.3.2 Ziran 
To follow the Tao is not to work towards the future, but to return to the origin, the Way, Tao, 
nature, the essence of man, the 'Daoist' Heaven. Wu wei is therefore turning to the inner and 
to 'being natural' or spontaneity (ziran). Wu wei is finding and relaxing yourself. Wu wei is 
action through unprejudiced inaction. Wu wei is stopping 'wanting to be'. Wu wei is not 
making a distinction in Being. Wu wei is accepting Yin as a unit with the Yang. That means 
that in Daoism Being cannot exist without the Nothing. The Nothing creates Being and vice 
versa. By not intervening, you bring the natural qualities of the Other or the I into expression 
(Van Buuren, 2011). To return to the natural self, Zhuang Zi says in passage 4:1 that Man 
must fast the heart: ‘empty yourself, do not think about anything anymore, be completely 
silent’ (in Schipper, 2010 p.13). It is not just about actively wanting to stop thinking, but also 
to stop wanting to stop actively. If that succeeds, then there is complete silence in man and he 
only moves from the Tao. Thus there is no moral virtue or norm that determines how the 
Daoist should behave, nor is it clear what It should be because that particular being has its 
own Te acting from the Tao. The lesson that Daoism wants to give is that the essence of Man 
should not be determined by a normative framework containing humans in their rituals and 
organizations, but that human act should come from spontaneity (ziran). Being is not 
imposed by the will of the other or the ego because it is Being, the Tao is. Being is not fixed 
either, but is context-bound and manifests when Man is open to ziran. Then man comes 
closer to his Tao, his natural self who then becomes a partial representation of Tao and the 
universe itself.  
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3.4 Daoist influence on Heidegger 
Since the 1960s there have been increasing indications that Heidegger has been strongly 
influenced by Eastern thinking, mainly Daoism (Stambaugh in Parkes, 1990. Pöggeler, in 
Parkes, 1990. May, Reinhard, 1996. Lee, 2001. Froese, 2006), and in particular his 
ontological and metaphysical reflections (Sorajjakool, 2001. Vlieger, 2014. Delaune, 2015). 
In the previous paragraphs it was explained that Heidegger had the wish to put philosophy 
back in the flow of life instead of its role as a distant seeker of an objective, fundamental 
truth (Clarke in Delaune, 2015, p.10). Heidegger had an aversion to the logos of analytical 
thinking and wished to replace it with a meditative mode of thinking. The most important 
clues on Heidegger’s link with Daoism have been collected by Professor Graham Parkes 
(1990) in the Heidegger and Asian thought collection and by Professor Lin Ma of University 
Leuven of which some have been described in this thesis.  
Heidegger's interest in Eastern thought developed in the context of the 20th century. 
The rapid growth of industrial capitalism worried Germany of a moral and spiritual gap in 
modern Western society (Delaune, 2015). A populist group, the Völkisch Bewegung, wanted 
to return to an idealistic romantic era in the past and sought, among other things, salvation in 
Eastern thinking (Clarke, in Delaune, 2015). Heidegger, in his twenties, became acquainted 
with Meister Eckhart’s Opus tripartitum38 and attempted to apply his conception of Being as 
a finite predicate to God but gave up39 on it (Pöggeler, 1990, p.47). In the literature it is not 
clear when and how Heidegger specifically started reading Taoist texts, but there has been 
enough anecdotal evidence of Heidegger acknowledging to others of his closeness with 
Daoism and Zen Buddhism. Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, one of Heidegger's best friends, wrote: 
"I knew how highly Heidegger esteemed Lao-tzu. But only after he died did I learn that at 
one point he began translating the Tao Te Ching." (Petzet, 1993, p.181). The Tao Te Ching is 
a collection of 81 chapters on how, from the Chinese philosophical Daoism thought, to lead a 
good and wise life.  
On invitation of Heidegger, a Chinese academic Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, worked together 
on a translation of the Tao Te Ching. Hsiao (1987, p.93) assumed that the Daoist philosopher 
Lao Zi's thinking could contribute to philosophical German thought and to clarify similarities 
between Chinese thought and Heideger's thinking. The project was not finished after eight 
                                              
38 A manual of Hungarian customary law  
39 God is by definition intelligere (understanding) 
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chapters, because Hsiao received several invitations in Germany to teach about Chinese 
thinking. In addition, Hsiao (1987, p.98) found that Heidegger, in his search for all meanings 
surrounding Daoism’s concepts and terminology, was being too creative in translating the 
Tao Te Ching. There was no ill intent, but Heidegger was doing this with great vigor in order 
to extract every possible meaning from the texts. In the attempts to translate the Taoist text, 
Heidegger had to move from a logos language to an ideographic language. Every Chinese 
character, which is also an ideogram, can have different meanings depending on the 
contextual sense. In order to be able to understand a Chinese text, according to Heidegger, all 
the meanings of each word and contextual sense must first be explained. Otto Pöggeler thinks 
that this is why Heidegger developed a cryptic and often criticized writing style in his work 
and explains it as follows:  
Heidegger "reads" and "translates" the graphemes of a language the spoken words of 
which he does not understand. But must we not first understand what is really going 
on when Heidegger speaks and reads as he does? Heidegger demands a language in 
which it is not primarily a question of univocal concepts and their coherent 
connection, but rather of images whose meanings are multidimensional and 
inexhaustible. Heidegger was impressed by the Thai monk because he did not 
enumerate the viewpoints of the conversation, nor did he proceed in a linear, 
discursive and analytical way: "For a European would keep saying: 'firstly,' 'then,' 
'thirdly' and so forth. But here there is no kind of 'logical progression’; rather, 
everything comes out of one center." Across the various dimensions of meaning every 
word is connected with every other; the breakthrough to the deeper dimensions 
transforms thinking and brings it on to a path. (Pöggeler, 1990, p.68) 
Heidegger's works are therefore easier to read when they are not read in an analytical manner, 
but with an associative attitude. The accusations by supporters of the analytical philosophical 
movement, however, are that Chinese thinking and Heidegger's thought cannot be described 
logically and argumentatively, and therefore leave subjective interpretation and ambiguity to 
the reader's discretion (Parkes, 1987, p.5). But this is just like in Heidegger’s Conversation 
with the three interlocutors with their own respective fields of expertise. By combining 
multiple research fields, new spaces of thinking are made possible when they are put together 
in dialogue. By refraining from fixating on a standpoint and using the correlative meditative 
thought the meanings and the discourse of the traditional Chinese thought is better 
understood and a different kind of thinking is achieved that is able to accept the ‘vagueness’ 
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of a correlative thought process. And so, we see faint hints at what could be contributive as a 
new insight to anthropocentrism.  
Heidegger uses Way before his own concept of Being, but the similarities are clearly 
present. Heidegger says in his lecture The Demand for Technology: ‘Questions builds a Way. 
We are advised in this and should therefore pay attention to the road. The Way is one of 
thought.’ (1993, p.311). To understand what Heidegger means by Weg (way), philosopher 
and professor at New York City University Joan Stambaugh first asks what it does not mean. 
For Heidegger, Way is not a scientific approach to thinking, because in that form of thinking 
knowledge is the object and desired goal. The goal is determined in advance in scientific 
thinking. A road beheld an undetermined goal which will reached. Heidegger rather refers to 
reflective thinking as being on the move on a road. It does not resemble a metaphysical 
character, such as Vorhandenheit, which would be the rule: people start from point A to point 
B in order to achieve a certain goal.  
Heidegger's discussion on Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit is also reflected in a 
parable (appendix D) 'the useless tree' of the Daoist philosopher Zhuang Zi. In this parable 
the logician Hui Zi complains that the tree they are standing at is useless, because the wood 
cannot be used. But Zhuang Zi points out to him that the tree can be useful for shade or as a 
landmark (Dreyfus in Delaune, 2015. p.4). Depending on the context and how people 
orientate themselves with their own frames of reference, objects(-subjects) are 'useful' and 
available only in personal opinion. Here we find a comparison between Heidegger and 
Zhuang Zi. Heidegger's concept Umgang is not translated by Dreyfus (in Delaune, p.5) as 
coping, but as handling with an emphasis on the Zen-like flow in the skillful use of tools that 
are available. In a previously mentioned parable, the cook Ding (Appendix C) makes elegant 
and skillful use of his available tools to slaughter the ox. The cook did not carelessly cut bone 
with his knife through bone and meat, but cuts with a consciousness that is constantly aware 
of the forms of the muscles, the positions of the bones and tendons. Cook Ding did not set his 
own rhythm on nature, but sought ways to coordinate the different rhythms of him, the knife, 
his body, the flesh, the bones and tendons and so on (Froese, 2006, p.109). Delaune (2015) 
remarks that this skillful action with tools and the interaction with objects transcends the 
Cartesian subject object thinking what Heidegger emphasizes in his philosophical thinking as 
in His and Time. In fact, Heidegger asks us to stop using language as an information source 
of 'utility', most notably in his example of the hammer. Heidegger would rather see that man 
reflects with the intention of ‘being on the road to’. In the following quotation from 
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Heidegger, according to Stambaugh, the most pronounced about Way in relation to Daoism is 
said to be: 
The word "way" probably is an ancient primary word that speaks to the reflective 
mind of man. The key word in Laotse's poetic thinking is Tao, which "properly 
speaking" means way. But because we are prone to think of "way" superficially, as a 
stretch connecting two places, our word "way" has all too rashly been considered unfit 
to name what Tao says. Tao is then translated as reason, mind, raison, meaning, 
logos. Yet Tao could be the way that gives all ways, the very source of our power to 
think what reason, mind, meaning, logos properly mean to say—properly, by their 
proper nature. Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of thoughtful Saying conceals itself in 
the word "way," Tao, if only we will let these names return to what they leave 
unspoken, if only we are capable of this, to allow them to do so. Perhaps the 
enigmatic power of today's reign of method also, and indeed preeminently, stems 
from the fact that the methods, notwithstanding their efficiency, are after all merely 
the runoff of a great hidden stream which moves all things along and makes way for 
everything. All is way. (Heidegger, 1971, p. 92.)  
 
For Heidegger (1971), Way is thus a source of reason and spirit that Man accepts. Heidegger 
says the same about thinking about Sein. The source, in Eckhart's words, the dimension in 
which man is in union with God, cannot be metaphysically and only be experienced. The 
point is that in Dasein Man is aware of Being and can only come into oneness with this 
Being. Walking on this Way creates an experience in which man rediscovers aspects of 
himself. The Way is not to be regarded as a metaphysical abstract symbol of a subjective all-
existing thought path, but a sensory path that only emerges while walking on the way to. The 
Dasein is thus actually a journey for Heidegger, or reaching for what can be achieved. Being 
human transcends from the Dasein that takes place in the clearing, in the lived and sensory 
experience of being on the way to. Heidegger explains this in an essay Die Sprache im 
Gedicht by Georg Trakl. It is about a man with madness (Wahnsinn) who’s senses feels 
differently. This man does not think in senseless delusions, but he experiences his senses 
differently from what happens normally to other people. Why a sensory experience? Because 
Sinnan, the sensory feeling, travel from origin, means to strive for a certain direction, says 
Heidegger (1971, p.53). So Stambaugh concludes that sensory feeling in Heidegger’s 
thinking means being practically experienced on the way to. This praxis of Way is made 
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possible by Gelassenheit. Heidegger’s meditation on dao is also seen when he explains Be-
wëgung (movement) as ‘the original giver and founder of ways’ (1971, p.92, p.198). Lin Ma 
points out two specific paragraphs in which Tao is mentioned by Heidegger40:  
‘The first paragraph runs: The word ‘way’ probably is a primal word [Urwort] of 
language that speaks to the reflective mind of man. The guideword [Leitwort] in 
Laotse’s poetic thinking is Tao, which ‘properly speaking’ [‘eigentlich’] refers to 
[bedeutet] way. But because we are prone to think of ‘way’ superficially, as a stretch 
connecting two places, our word ‘way’ has all too rashly been considered unfit to 
name what Tao says. Tao is then translated as reason [Vernunft], spirit [Geist], 
raison [Raison], meaning [Sinn], logos.’ (in Ma, 1971, p. 92/p. 198; tr. m.) 
And, 
‘Yet Tao could be the way that gives all ways [der alles be-wëgende Weg], that which 
makes possible our power to think what reason, mind, meaning [Sinn], logos may say 
properly, that is, by their proper nature. Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of 
thoughtful Saying [denkenden Sagens] conceals itself in the word Weg, Tao, if only 
we will let these names return to what they leave unspoken, if only we are capable of 
this, to allow them to do so. Perhaps the enigmatic power of today’s reign of method 
also, and indeed preeminently, stems from the fact that the methods, notwithstanding 
their efficiency, are after all merely the drainage of a great hidden stream which 
moves [be-we¨gt] all things along its track-drawing way [seine Bahn reißenden 
Weges]. All is way.’ (in Ma, 1971, p. 92/p. 198; tr. m.)  
In Heidegger's thinking, resignation is beyond the difference of activity and passivity (1966, 
p.61). It is an open attitude without expectations. Similar to Eckhart's imperturbability we 
also see this reflected in the Taoist wu wei. In Heidegger's later works, the word lassen (in the 
word gelassenheit) becomes more prominent. Man has to leave Dasein to form an ego that 
objectifies things to their own functional use with zuhandenheit. But the lived experience 
should not be reduced to what is useful at that moment. To achieve that, something must be 
done. How can you not want something, to not want? It is not possible to be 'just' there. Just 
like how acting through not acting seems to be a contradictory concept, but that is not the 
                                              
40 Heidegger has not denied his interest in Daoism in person to his peers, but Daoist concepts are rarely 
mentioned in his philosophical works. The two passages Lin Ma refers to, are stated to prove Heidegger has 
been well-versed in Daoist philosophy and has incorporated it into his own works.  
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case in practice (Schipper, 2007). Heidegger solves this problem with the word Inständigkeit 
(non-persistence). Stambaugh (1990, p.87) explains this word as a non-passive, but very 
intensely attentive attitude of waiting that can be seen, for example, with a musician who 
gathers together just before his music, or that a baseball player concentrates intensely for the 
pitch. For Stambaugh (ibid, p.87) it is reminiscent of the Buddhist Zen monk Dōgen who 
calls it a sustained exertion, continuous effort. It is not an indifferent passive attitude, but an 
attentive41 unwilling attitude, which, according to Stambaugh, endures. However, Visser will 
call it an attitude "where our thinking, speaking and acting are not determined by selfish 
motives, but are carried by an inner silence" (in Steenhuis, 2008). The pre-conceptual 
thinking can only be expressed through a sensory and pure language that is left. This means 
that the person does not speak from the utility of objects, but from the experience in the 
vicinity of those objects. In this way, Gelassenheit offers an inner peace from the inner space. 
Eckhart, Heidegger and Sloterdijk have tried to think through an anthropocentric 
problem, but each one of them received institutional violence for their way of thinking. 
Heidegger has been scrutinized for his cryptic writing and ridiculed for his comment: “Man 
needs to be a shepherd of Sein.” Sloterdijk got tarred by Jürgen Habermas for being 
misunderstood on his warning call against innocent eugenetics and Meister Eckhart was 
accused by the Pope of pantheism and heresy. If, according to them, humanism failed due to 
an anthropocentrism and its supporters became hyper morally activist, how should humanism 
think freely from this destructive attitude towards self-criticism? For Sloterdijk this means an 
impetus for a codex of ascetic anthropotechniques, for Heidegger an attentive action on the 
Way to Dasein and for Eckhart a gelassen meditative behavior. The Sein seems to show close 
similarities with Tao and Gelassenheit with a non-ascetic wu wei. It is therefore unmistakable 
that Daoism influenced Heidegger and later Sloterdijk on the reflection of humanism. 
Following Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida, Heidegger tried to break through rational 
difference and deconstructive thinking by understanding Daoism and Eastern thinking. Taoist 
inspirations have been able to promote his philosophical thoughts about Sein, Dasein and 
Gelassenheit. From this, a posthumanist message results that humanism must transcend a 
self-ego with Dasein and by living in the experiences of the world (Froese, 2008). 
                                              
41 What we now call ‘mindful’ 
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Chapter 4 (In)commensurability  
In Chapter 4, I will discuss the similarities and differences between main concepts of Daoism 
and humanism by showing discussions between Daoist and Confucian philosophy and the 
duality of Western philosophy and non-duality of Eastern thought. The first part of this 
chapter concentrates on the dialogue and differences between Daoism in Eastern thought and 
humanism. In the latter half, I will have humanist philosopher Joep Dohmen confront Daoism 
on the arguments made for and against anthropocentrism. At first sight, we may find two 
non-commensurable philosophical discourses. By its extent, we may also find answers to 
tackling the issue of humanist anthropocentrical ecocentrism.  
4.1 Eastern thought explained through non-duality   
To Ilse Bulhof (2005), empowerment, personal responsibility and tolerance may be the most 
central ideals of modern non-theist humanism. In Eastern spiritual traditions, ideals such as 
self-loss and selflessness are considered as most wanted. By removing the entire ego of the 
self, a place is opened for the Buddha-nature. This may seem like an anti-humanism but 
should be considered an Eastern humanism with connections to non-dualistic or mystic 
traditions. To Bulhof, non-duality means the congregation of both object and subject such as 
becoming one with God. Dualism like ‘Being and beings, God and world, God and human, 
subject and object’ are used in the western philosophical discourse to clarify and position 
objects and subjects. In Buddhism, non-duality shapes a special kind of fellow humanity, 
usually indicated as compassion. ‘A compassion as a congregation of on one hand ‘letting be’ 
of everything and on the other hand sympathizing with everything that suffers (ibid, p.302). 
In the study of David Loy (1998) Non-duality: A study in Comparative Philosophy there lies 
a deep experience of non-duality in all Eastern spiritual traditions. Although Bulhof makes 
point that non-duality has been tried in Western philosophy such as the Neo-Platonism of 
Plotinus, Meister Eckhart and Nietzsche, they have not gained fruition. But in the East, 
Buddhism, Vedanta and Daoism were the most influential Eastern philosophic species, 
according to Loy. In these Eastern philosophical systems, the world that we are used to is not 
absolutized (Bulhof, 2005, p.304). The world of our daily experience, comprised from 
separate objects connected by causal relationships is not seen as the only possible world. 
Another world of non-dual experience is considered superior and more truthful in Eastern 
thought. Thus from Eastern perspective, to think there is only one way to experience the 
world is a post-Aristotelian basis that we do not realize it is an opinion instead of truth (Loy 
in Bulhof, p.304). So, Bulhof states that in the dominant western culture, there is a blind spot 
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for other ways of experiencing things. But by calling non-dual experience unspeakable and 
only achievable after a long spiritual training, it is not appealing and elitarian to Western 
philosophers. Also, to experience non-duality, philosophy and the discursive reason need to 
be transcended (ibid). To understand Eastern thought, the western philosopher needs to revise 
his thought processes into non-duality thinking but also have to accept that his philosophical 
tools to deconstruct, analyze and rationalize are plainly unuseful. Experiencing Eastern 
meditative thought comes down to an embodied and spiritual experience (De Martelaere, 
2006. Van Ijssel, 2007).   
As example of a freeing effect of non-duality experiences, Bulhof (2005) makes the 
exercise of observing a cup. By looking with utmost attention, wonder and subordination to 
this cup, a certain way of looking is eventually transcended. The metaphysical construct of 
me as subject observing the cup as object is lost and then there is the other way of 
observation, without subject, selfless and without a Me. It brings to attention that deciding the 
cup is Asian and thus the characteristics of Bulhof such as being a philosopher, being 
[culturally] woman, having blond hair and being Dutch are activities, not categorials. She was 
taught that she has blond hair; it is not like she already knew at birth that she has blond hair. 
By letting all these activities go in this exercise, only a ‘pure’ I-less observation remains. To 
merge into watching this cup is not an act of the actor (I see the cup), but a state of Being a 
watcher (a be of watching). The I is then not a psychophysical entity that does or does not do 
something, but a way where in a certain space, in a certain time space is ‘Being-t’, an activity 
without the focused strivings of the I (ibid, p.307). By letting go of all metaphysics, 
provisions, even a body and identity, Bulhof becomes fully free of any human constructs. To 
be nothing at all, gives a feeling of being One with all and being connected with everything 
(ibid).   
 A second example of non-duality is signified by identification, says Bulhof (2005). 
Knowing by identification - something you learn by doing - copying the other being. It is a 
learned skill until it becomes, what we call, ‘second nature’. The subject lets go of his being-
a-subject, of the I. This becomes a psychophysical process: mentally and at the same time 
embodied. All body senses take part in this observation ‘mode’. Because knowing by 
identification is merging into the other, it is knowing in the here and now. It cannot be 
objectified and therefore is outside the discursive intellect (ibid, p.309). Unlike the 
transmission of knowledge, to experience and to be something are personal but in the western 
culture, these skills are seen as less important than knowing rationally (ibid, p.310). Professor 
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Maarten Van Buuren (2011) illustrates a contemporary anecdote of the Tao and Being during 
his video lecture, in resonance with the identification process. He has tried a number of forms 
of Zen meditation and Tai Chi Chuan to find balance and unwind, but those just were not his 
thing. Then he found out that what he tried to achieve with meditation, he has always done it 
through cycling. He cycles with a racing bike without paying attention to the cycling norm: 
the ideal posture, a relaxed upper body, the correct sitting posture and the ideal rhythm. At a 
given moment, after a first number of kilometers, he observes what he calls ‘a blurring of my 
ego’ (ibid, 1:04:15-1:05:06). The ego Maarten van Buuren, his body, his bike are no longer 
there. He has become 'cycling' and 'movement'. He completely loses the realization that he is 
on the bike and is cycling. In other words, he has merged or identified into the Tao (or Zen) 
as he is now acting natural (ziran) through inaction (wu wei). In addition, he even merges into 
the landscape where he finds himself, with the mushrooms, the hay and the sparrows. His 
borders are fading so that he becomes part of the landscape. That is the real happiness that 
catches him when he cycles, he says. In this state of Being, he was offered solutions that he 
had not yet realized as problems. Unknown problems were already solved by not thinking 
about those problems. So, this state of mind makes one free of constructs that otherwise may 
unknowingly hold back the ego.  
4.2 Daoist ethics  
In a thought experiment (Appendix E), Russel Kirkland, a leading American professor in 
Daoism, asked students what Mencius, successor of Confucius, and Taoist Zhuang Zi would 
do if a baby were to fall into a river. In short, a student has relatively easily solved this 
experiment. Confucian Mencius would immediately jump into the river to save the baby, 
because the virtue ren (humanity), he cannot and should not do anything else than rescuing 
the baby. Daoist Zhuang Zi would have no reason to intervene; the process of saving the baby 
was already under way by Mencius. If Mencius had not intervened, Zhuang Zi might have 
come into action to restore harmony. Be it Te, the inner strength given by Tao, or wu wei that 
would have urged Zhuang Zi to intervene, it would only have been because the harmony of 
his environment would be restored. But Zhuang Zi would not save the baby because he 
himself wanted to. He trusts that Nature in her incomprehensible processes will do something 
with the baby in an auto-regulating way. The baby is in fact left to its fate, determined by the 
other dynamic influences of Tao. However well-intentioned, from a Daoist perspective, Man 
will inevitably do more harm than good with forced interventions. Kirkland (n.d.) goes so far 
in his analysis in his claim that Zhuang Zi will never save the baby. In Kirkland's analysis 
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(ibid, p.1-15) Zhuang Zi will not do this because he has no moral compassion, but because 
his moral compassion is grounded in a more complex vision of the nature, the Tao, of the 
world. He watches and takes no action, because that is the only correct moral action for the 
Taoist. Admitting to impulses and feelings would be a sign of weak morality, because the 
Taoist is not being one with the Tao. The humanist may feel morally forced by his impulsive 
emotions, his conscience and his moral compass to intervene in places where life threatens to 
be lost. That is exactly the opposite for the Taoist. He will feel morally forced not to 
intervene, to respect the Tao. People tend to judge quickly and simplistically about events 
based on simple assumptions such as life is better than death and beautiful is better than ugly. 
The Daoist cannot be tempted by these impulses, but questions the event and leaves the 
prejudices aside. When Zhuang Zi's wife passed away, Zhuang Zi would have had sorrow, 
but would rationally reflect on life and have come to accept that his wife did not do anything 
else than be in a natural process of life and death. To act against that natural process with 
anger would only show immature moral behavior, because it then acts against something that 
always happens, without exceptions, in nature. It would therefore be better in Taoist terms to 
hold back and reflect on. In a follow-up of the baby thought experiment, Kirkland asks the 
question: What if the baby was a Chinese version of Adolf Hitler and he would kill more than 
1 million people in his life? (ibid, p.11). Would he let the baby drown? And would that serve 
a higher moral purpose? Or does every person have a fundamental and moral right to life? 
What Zhuang Zi tries to teach is that we cannot know, at the moment, which action is right. 
For Zhuang Zi, human wisdom is impossible to fully consider an event and to judge it 
correctly. It is impossible for the Taoist to know. In addition, a 'good ending' is not 
guaranteed while it is expected by humanist Confucianists. These events are natural and 
belong to the Tao. Kirkland concludes in his analysis that sentimental binding to objects, 
patterns of life and people from Taoist perspective bring unnecessary stress when something 
bad happens. The Taoist would be responsible and mature to calm down irrational emotions 
and accept the new course of events out of moral consideration. This does not mean that 
Daoism would always be completely passive, but it means that the Taoist would not base his 
morality on the basis of human virtues. The Taoist would base his moral behavior on the Tao, 
the Being, on Heaven and Earth. The Taoist trusts that the Tao improves life behind the 
scenes, outside the eyes of people, as long as man does not intervene. Taoist thinking 
therefore actually offers a non-humanist morality. The Taoist trusts that the Tao brings life 
and therefore will not act because he respects the Being of nature. That means that not all 
good sides of life, but also all bad sides of life have to be accepted. Although it must be 
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remembered that good and bad are not Taoist categories. These are humanist categories that 
continue to point to the hasty moral humanistic virtues in the knowledge of Sein-zum-Tode 
(Being towards death). 
The Daoist will try to let the wu wei (non-act) flourish the virtues of the unique others 
by creating a harmonious society in relationships with each other. That is to say that the 
Taoist will try to encourage people to interact with each other, but in such a way that he does 
not take any action himself and thus the authentic other person can unfold in his uniqueness. 
The point is not to build artificiality in the natural world, something like moral virtues 
because that removes man from the Tao. Human love and therefore humanity is not a Taoist 
principle and is even contradicted in a Confucian framework. "Loving people is the 
beginning of harming people." (Watson in De Martelaere, 2006, p.110). Zhuang Zi and Lao 
Zi both reject humanity because it is artificial as moral virtue. It does not come from the Tao, 
from the inside, but is imposed on the human being from the outside. 
May I ask, Lao Zi asked, “Are humanity and righteousness the essence of being 
human?” “Certainly,” Confucius said, “if the noble is not humane, he has no purpose, 
and if he is not righteous, he has no life. Humanity and righteousness are essentially 
part of the innate nature of man. How can it be different?” “May I ask, what are 
humanity and righteousness?” “It is about being one, finding a center in the heart, 
loving everything, without self-interest - that is what kindness and righteousness are.” 
Confucius replied. “Really! Your words point to misunderstanding,” Lao Zi said. “To 
love everything is vague and exaggerated at the same time. Without self-interest, is 
that not self-interest? Sir, if you want people to stay simple, would you not look better 
at the ways of Heaven and Earth? [...] Sir, walk with Te and travel with Tao and you 
will attain perfection. Why be concerned about all that humanity and righteousness, 
progressing as if you were rattling on a drum and looking for a lost child. (Watson in 
De Martelaere, 2006, p.112) 
Reading this seemingly passive ethics, one could easily think that Daoists are near-
nihilistically passive and amoral. However, this is not correct. The principle of wu wei 
‘questions the basic assumptions of norms and offers an individual the freedom “to be” 
within the reality of nonbeing itself.’ (Sorajjakool, 2001, p.138). Daoists are therefore 
morally obliged to question reality at which moral principles are based on. In doing so, they 
become free of ‘chained norms’ and ‘be’.  
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4.3 Daoist and humanist self-care 
Humanist philosopher Joep Dohmen (2011) believes that people start self-care because they 
sooner or later have a feeling of being 'too late'. One gains respite through the awareness of 
missed experiences, missed time, diluted relationships, and so on. They took no action while 
they could have done that much earlier. Suddenly it is 'too late'. Some people are shaken 
awkwardly to realize that they are responsible for their own attitude to life. It is a painful 
discovery that people could have done more with their lives than they did. Regret and 
reconciliation offer a new phase of recovery and renewed contacts. The art of living refers to 
the important role of ‘the right moment' in our lives’ (Dohmen, 2007, p.36). Sometimes that 
right moment is initiated by an inspiring moment, but very often by a negative experience 
that, according to Dohmen, initiates a secular conversion: the turn to ourselves (ibid, p.36). 
Motivation for self-responsibility usually comes from experiences where opportunities have 
been missed, so one must intervene in time to be on time the next time. Here the excitement 
resounds that also occurs in Confucianism. We make anthropocentric goals and standards that 
we humanists have to meet. In fact, we regret (as Sorajjakool and Heidegger already agreed) 
if we realize that finiteness is further ahead. That is why we want to achieve goals faster and 
faster. We want dasein in the world (in-der-Welt). Daoism counteracts that wanting. Wanting 
can only push humanists forward but it cannot slow down. So, according to Daoism, 
humanists will not find peace, if they always look forward out of fear of the finiteness that 
haunts them indifferently. Humanistic art of living demands autonomy, self-determination, 
self-responsibility, self-control, self-management, but that is done to get your own life under 
control so that the quality of life and the meaning of your existence is guaranteed. In 
Kunneman’s Radical humanism’s words, to relieve and ban out tension. Humanistic self-care 
refers to quality of life, to life from the self and from its own order of values. According to 
Dohmen that is 'authenticity'. In Daoism we have seen that self-care for Taoists means: acting 
through inaction (wu wei) because acting is in conflict with the Tao. But by acting passively 
with attention to the Tao, the Taoist comes to a resignation. Natural processes are negated by 
human action because he cannot know whether his interventions are leading to the good 
result. How do we know for sure that self-management, self-knowledge and awareness will 
always lead to the desired result? What if we are going to fully organize our lives with all 
kinds of goals, with a high quality of life and meaning, who says that tomorrow we will not 
be killed in a car accident? In this regard, Dohmen recruits British philosopher Bertrand 
Russel who pleaded for self-forgetfulness. Russell seems to be ally of Daoism here, because 
he thinks that unhappy people are only focused on themselves. Russell just got happier by 
 71 
focusing less on himself. People would not focus on themselves, but should dedicate 
themselves to a cause. By forgetting yourself, happiness comes true, Russell agrees (ibid, 
p.27). Dohmen disparages this statement. There are also enough people who forget 
themselves and do not become happy. How and how much do you commit to a case? When is 
it real and when has it escaped? All these questions ask the self to be focused on the self. For 
Dohmen, this plea of Russel is a farce, except for the exaggerated narcissism of some people. 
People must consciously lead their own lives through self-care, Dohmen says. He criticizes 
Russell for not appreciating the quality of a human life. The plea for devotion can only be 
attractive if someone really wants to commit to a case. Anyone who does not wonder what 
the matter is and why he wants to dedicate himself, risks a superficial life. This statement of 
Dohmen actually implicates anthropocentric motives. Daoism would ask 1. why do you need 
to act on base of will? 2. why is it superficial to not wonder what to dedicate to? 3. why do 
you need to dedicate? 4. why can’t you just sit still and listen carefully, mindfully? 5. why do 
you need to focus on yourself and not just be what you are? Again Dohmen (ibid, p.44) sees 
salvation in the art of living because it refers to a learning process in which "self-knowledge, 
legal capacity and normative evaluation" go hand in hand. For Dohmen, Zen Buddhism is 
unsuitable as an Eastern art of living for Western artists. The learning process is recognized 
by both and takes the individual as a starting point, but Buddhism demands detachment and 
"even quasi-extinction of the self" (ibid, p.51). The detachment of norms and values would be 
at odds with the art of living that is based on valid frameworks, codes and rules. Dohmen 
(ibid, p.51) therefore believes that Zen Buddhism extinguishes personal life while arguing for 
his alternative that proclaims a "proud modesty on the basis of normative self-care". 
Sorajjakool would say that these values and norms lead to misfortune because Dasein is 
being absolutized. In that sense, Daoism and the art of living would not be commensurable. 
They are diametrically opposed. The notion of authenticity is also completely different for 
Dohmen and Zhuang Zi. For Dohmen authenticity means that from the self is lived by its 
own values, but for Zhuang Zi ziran would mean that he will be one with the Tao in which he 
merges into the larger whole. A truthful being by harmonizing with this being.  
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Final considerations  
This master thesis has performed a hermeneutical literature research in search of an 
intervention option to the debate on the Anthropocene by linking Daoist spirituality with 
Heidegger’s thought on Being. It has followed a critique on the philosophical reflection on 
the centering of humans in the universe, namely anthropocentrism by naming high-profiled 
western thinkers who have tried non-dualistic and anti-metaphysical philosophies. Attempts 
are made at making Tao and traditional Eastern thought comprehensible and with a potential 
to enrich humanism with Eastern insights on spirituality. By studying sources on Daoism, 
Confucianism, Heidegger, Eastern thought and spirituality as an overarching way to connect 
the dots in figure 1, implicated answers are found on the question:  
How do anti-metaphysical criticisms of Martin Heidegger, Peter Sloterdijk and Meister 
Eckhart relate to Daoist criticism on the Confucian concept of humanity and be 
interpreted as an enrichment to modern humanism’s position in the debate on the 
Anthropocene? 
In this study anthropocentrism is seen as a problem for humanism and the western 
philosophical tradition. In historical sense, Heidegger and Sloterdijk criticise humanism to be 
ineffective in schooling humans to be humane. Kunneman acknowledges that humanism had 
its own part in the cultural legitimization of Mankind’s apathy towards other life forms. 
Although some humanist philosophers attempt to horizontalize the vertical relationships with 
other life forms, they seem to do this from an anthropocentric starting point. In the spirit of 
Edward Said, Kunneman wants to find the moral act to care for nature by humanism’s own 
tradition of humanity. This humanity, as Kunneman (2017) quotes Paul Ricoeur, focuses on 
creating a good quality of life with democratic and righteous societical proportions. Thus is 
humanism not only critical but also non-egoistically self-critical, Kunneman (2017) and Van 
Praag (2004) say. Kunneman would go as far as a radical horizontalization of humanism, but 
Kunneman does this from within the frames of humanism. As Kunneman (2017) shows that 
Paul Ricoeur keeps horizontalization to humans, Kunneman challenges humanism to 
radicalise this horizontalization, being a characteristic of humanism Kunneman says, to other 
life forms. From Eastern thought perspective, Kunneman’s proposal is not radical enough 
insofar the starting point is still Mankind and humanity still focuses on humans first. 
Kunneman’s analysis (2017) points to a critique on humanism having had an overly focus on 
Bildung, scientific reasoning and autonomy, leaving the parapoietic capabalities redundant. In 
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his thought, Kunneman criticizes Mankind’s technological and view and leaves it to ‘slow 
questions’ and the humans who still take part in the humanization process to find out 
answers. But how come this principle is still called ‘humanity’ if it needs to go before 
humans? Also, there is no intrinsic value put on other life forms while this is assumed in 
humans. So, my implication is that this radicalization from humanism’s own tradition is not 
enough. Wissenburg attempts to solve the Anthropocene problem by making humanists 
aware of the choice they have to act and therein their identity that is reflected by nature. But 
in this, only the choice of the individual human is respected. It does not lent for an 
organizational code of conduct. Manschot and Tu opt for an anthropocosmic perspective, one 
that still suprapositions humans. So, humanist philosophers seem have the tendency to keep 
humans in a supraposition in the cosmos. Which I imply as being anthropocentric in an 
ecocentric answer, with a fear that humanism may not achieve radical horizontalization. I 
think it shows how dogmatic anthropocentrism is in the western philosophical tradition and in 
humanism. Therefore, I think humanism needs an interlocuting philosophy that can be its 
antagonist, one that keeps criticizing humanism as to remind what the essence of humanism 
is. What I illustrate in this thesis is that this form of interaction has occurred in Chinese 
traditions Daoism and Confucianism, and with a different philosophical discourse. One in 
which spirituality and mysticism has no duality with reasoning as it has been in western 
philosophical tradition.  
The criticism of anthropocentrism by Heidegger, Eckhart and Sloterdijk focuses on a 
dimension of Man that contains forgotten parts or divinity. Heidegger believes that humanism 
and humanitas have been based on a misunderstanding of the essential nature of Man due to 
the metaphysical limitations of the philosophical tradition (Froese, 2006, p.9). As long as 
man defines himself as an animal rationale, humanity will remain subordinate to the ideas 
that are formed about Mankind in a long tradition. Heidegger appears to have gained 
inspiration from Daoism to catalyze his antimetaphysical thought. The Heideggerian Being 
and Gelassenheit are very similar to the Tao and wu wei of Daoism. Heidegger, Sloterdijk 
and Eckhart argue for a praxis of philosophy to offer a solution against anthropocentrism. 
Again, this is not to say that Eastern thought is better, more complete or more inclusive than 
Western thought. These two worlds are most likely incommensurable due to their polar 
differences in duality and non-duality thinking, in reasoning and mysticism, in analytical and 
associative circulair thinking. Western philosophical tradition has developed the freedom of 
thought, autonomy, separation of powers, categorial thinking, equality, human rights, 
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scientific and epistemological thinking to name a few. These are benefits that can enrich 
Eastern philosophical thought. But this thesis concentrates on what Daoism has to offer to 
modern humanism, as hinted by the link of Heidegger’s criticism on humanism and Daoism. 
If western philosophy and modern humanism could be open to Eastern spirituality and its 
philosophical discourse, as spiritual humanism and Christians are doing now with Zen-
Buddhism, synthesis and enrichments on both sides could happen. A synthesis could be like 
the deeper understanding of care for the human Being. One that should be attuned to bringing 
Man back to his essence says Heidegger (1999). Through care, Dasein-with and Dasein-in 
becomes Dasein-for. To Heidegger, caring (Sorg) means to care for the presentness and 
obscurity of Being itself (Steiner, 1978). To make humans (homo) humane (humanus) and 
not inhumane (outside his essence), care is the meaning of Being. So humanity exists in 
human’s being. Heidegger’s Sorg, and therefore herding by taking care of Dasein, instead of 
humanism’s ‘chosen ideals’ such as sustainability. In other words, we should care as a 
responsibility for the authentic instead of idealizing and radicalizing the ‘chosen’ authentic. 
Here, we may find struggles of humanism’s autonomy and freedom ideals against a 
degrading freedom of nature.  
A history and explanation of Daoism versus 'humanist' Confucianism made it clear 
that the discussion about anthropocentrism in China had been going on for much longer albeit 
in its own historical and philosophical context. A contribution that Daoism could make to 
humanism is that people should also accept the ugly sides and the finiteness of life. As a 
result, Man should not oppose nor instrumentalize nature or improve their lives with 
dependable technologies but spiritually live in or with nature. The fear and regret that a 
finitude is due is the reason why humanists continue to rush ahead with its techné. Adopting a 
resolute gelassen or wu wei attitude in accepting a Sein-zum-Tode as a part of natural 
progress may break this cycle. This would implicate a redefinition of the Self by being aware 
of the Being of nature and being aware of Dasein. In particular, neo-Confucianism has been 
further 'humanized' in modern times. Professor Tu Weiming is considered a leading figure in 
this tradition. In many ways, Daoism is antagonistic to humanism. It rejects humanity by 
relativizing reality, harmonizing with the Tao and deabsolutizing Confucian’s humanity. 
Daoism assumes that humanity is not necessary.  Daoism is also a meditative praxis 
philosophy, awareness and openness are practices that need to be cultivated to be ziran. Like 
Buddhism and all other Eastern traditions, its focus is not on learning truths, but on personal 
experiential learning (Belhof, 2005, p. 313). To western humanism, Daoism is interesting as 
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an interlocuting opponent and sparring partner to reflect on humanism’s philosophical 
shortcomings and may be of high instrumental value with its meditative praxis. 
Buddhism is currently the only Eastern tradition being well examined by western 
philosophers, but Buddhism is just one of the many Eastern traditions it has been interwoven 
with. Separating Buddhism from these other Eastern sources, does not honor the historical 
relationships and influences it has with other philosophies like Daoism. As Chinese thought 
made Hindu Buddhism logical and carried Chan-Buddhism over to Japan, the essence of Zen 
was incorporated and now presumably owned as being originated in Buddhism itself. Daoism 
has has many influences in Heidegger and in Buddhism, yet it remains a superficial source. 
But if we are to rethink our relationship with Earth, I think we have to learn to appreciate 
mysticism and spirituality as a means of understanding what ‘being-in-the-world’ means and 
thus how to relate to other beings. Insofar, I agree with Bulhof that Eastern thought has many 
possible implications for an Eastern humanism and would prefer an interaction between a 
Western and Eastern humanism.  
In the Humanist Canon there is hardly any information about Daoism or 
Confucianism. Zen-Buddhism is much more researched and also being read in the UvH-
curriculum, such as the works of Zen Buddhist monk Thich Naht Hanh. However, in China 
these three traditions of Daoism, Confucianism and Buddhism are together considered the 
holy three that have shaped Chinese thought. Namely Daoism and Confucianism were 
created around 350 BCE and have ever since been in dialog with each other. These three 
traditions have heavily dialogized, critized and reflected on each other’s comments since their 
beginning. Confucianism is interesting because it is a Chinese equivalent of old European 
humanism. Perhaps common grounds can be found that leads to a universal humanism. 
Maybe it would lead to a more universal humanism. Humanistic studies should consider 
advancing into comparative philosophy and explore Ulrich Libbrecht’s thoughts. It is only in 
the very last phase that I found out Prof. dr. Ulrich Libbrecht’s model of comparative 
philosophy. Therefore, I have not been able to process his philosophical insights. On first 
sight, I do find similar insights with the philosophical findings from Prof. dr. Ulrich 
Libbrecht. In his last book Met dank aan het leven (With Thanks to Life), he assumes that 
everything that is materialized is actually condensed energy. He also claims that duality 
thinking makes it harder to live life. Rather, humans should be and intervene less in nature 
and in themselves. By not intervening, nature and Man stabilizes itself. Apparently, here he 
also refers to wu wei and mysticism. I would opt his thinking or his comparative philosophy 
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to be a potential research field for Humanistic Studies.. I acknowledge that this thesis only 
scratches the walls of the historical, cultural, philosophical, theological complex contexts of 
Mankind. But I do hope that the thesis has shown opportunities for further research and 
reflection in Eastern thought as an enrichment for modern humanism and as a critical insight 
for the debate on the Anthropocene.  
In the last two appendices (F and G), I have added my reflections of Daoist spirituality 
on humanist chaplaincy and have added text of Siroj Sorajjakool and his book Wu Wei. 
Negativity and Depression. The principle of Non-trying in the Practice of Pastoral Care. This 
was a sidetrack in my research, but I felt it may have some potential value to whom might be 
interested in future research on approaching Daoism and Daoist spirituality in humanist 
chaplaincy. Sorajjakool describes the principle of wu-wei as a coping skill against depression 
in pastoral care. His findings may be able to initiate Daoist insights on spirituality and self-
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LAO ZI Chapter 1 
 
The Dao that can be referred to as 'Dao', 
is not the permanent Dao. 
The name that can be mentioned, 
is not the permanent name. 
'Nothing' is the name for the beginning of heaven and earth. 
'Existence' is the name for the mother of the ten thousand things. 
Therefore, 
is from his permanent nothing to watch his mystery, 
From his human existence, his limit can be looked at. 
These both spring together, 
but have a different name. 
Together they can be called 'deep'. 












Ransdorp, R. (2007). Zwervend met Zhuang Zi. Wegwijs in de taoïstische filosofie. [Roaming 
with Zhuang Zi. Get familiar with Taoist philosophy]. 3rd ed. (pp.31). Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands: Damon Budel.  
 84 
Appendix B 
LAO ZI HOOFDSTUK 25 
 
A form emerged in the chaos, 
were born for heaven and value. 
Silently absorbed he stood alone, unchanging. 
 
You may view him as the mother of the cosmos. 
I still do not know his [real] name. 
Only a nickname, and that is: 'Tao'. 
Furthermore, I cannot do better than to call him 'big'. 
Great, that means: the source. 
The source, that means: far away. 
Far away, that means that it returns. 
 
Truly: the Tao is great, and so are heaven and earth. 
Man is also big. 
 
Man corresponds to the earth, 
the earth with the sky, 
the sky with the Tao, 





Comment from author Schipper (p.70): 
 
"This section is famous, and especially this last sentence (in Chinese: Dao fa ziran) is often 
quoted. The verb fa has a rich variegation of meanings, among which that of 'imitation' is a 
very general one, and in any case better known than the more original meaning of 'agree 
with'. That is why they often translate here: 
 
Man shapes himself / takes the earth as an example. 
The earth forms to / takes heaven as an example. 
The sky forms to / takes as an example the Tao. 
The Tao forms to / takes as an example nature (the natural). 
 
That in turn raises discussions about whether, ontologically, nature does not precede the Tao! 
Of course that is not the case, and the meaning of Dao fa ziran must be understood in the 
sense that 'that which is as it is' (ziran) is an attribute of the Tao. " 
 
 
Zi, L. (2010) Lao Zi. Het boek van de Tao en de innerlijke kracht. [Lao Zi. The Book of Tao 





THE TALE OF COOK DING 
Cook Ding was carving an ox carcass for Lord Wenhui. With each touch of his hand, heave  
of his shoulder, step of his feet, thrust of his knee – whop! whish! – he wielded his knife with 
a whoosh, and every move was in rhythm. It was as though he were performing the Dance of 
the Mulberry Grove or keeping to the beat of the Constant Source music.  
“Ah, marvelous!” said Lord Wenhui. “Surely this is the acme of skill!”  
Cook Ding laid down his knife and replied, “What your servant loves, my lord, is the 
Dao, and that is a step beyond skill.  
“At the beginning, when I first began carving up oxen, all I could see was the whole 
carcass. After three years I could no longer see the carcass whole, and now I meet it with my 
spirit and don’t look with my eyes. Perception and understanding cease and spirit moves as it 
will. I follow the natural form: slicing the major joints I guide the knife through the big 
hollows, and by conforming to the inherent contours, no vessels or tendons or tangles of 
sinews – much less the big bones – block my blade in the least.  
“A good cook changes his knife once a year, but this is mere slicing. An ordinary 
cook changes his knife once a month, because he hacks. I’ve been using this knife now for 
nineteen years; it has carved thousands of oxen, yet the blade is as sharp as one fresh off the 
grindstone. You see, there are gaps between these joints, but the blade edge has no thickness. 
If a knife with no thickness moves into a gap, then it’s wide as need be and the blade wanders 
freely with plenty of leeway. That’s why after nineteen years the blade of my knife is as sharp 
as one fresh off the grindstone. 
“But nevertheless, whenever a tangled knot lies ahead, I spot the challenge and on the 
alert I focus my sight and slow down my hand – then I flick the blade with the slightest of 
moves, and before you know it the carcass has fallen apart like earth crumbling to the ground. 
I stand with knife raised and face all four directions in turn, prancing in place with complete 
satisfaction. Then I wipe off the knife and put it away.”  
“How fine!” said Lord Wenhui. “Listening to the words of Cook Ding, I have learned 
how to nurture life!” 
 
Comment of Robert Eno:  
The tale of Cook Ding is in some respects the central tale of the Zhuangzi. It belongs to a set 
of stories that are sometimes referred to as the “knack passages” of the text. In these tales, 
individuals penetrate to a state of some sort of unity with the Dao by means of the 
performance of some thoroughly mastered skill, which they have acquired through long 
practice of an art (which may be called a dao, as in “the dao of archery,” and so forth). The 
passages celebrate the power of spontaneously performed skill mastery to provide 
communion with the spontaneous processes of Nature. 
 
Zi, Z. (2010). The Inner Chapters (Eno, R., translation). [Lecture]. Consulted op 3 January 
2018, van http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Zhuangzi.pdf 
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Appendix D 
THE USELESS TREE 
Hui Zi once said to Zhuang Zi: 'Take that big tree, which people call chu. His thick trunk is 
full of lumps and bumps. There is no straight line to pull up. His branches are all crooked and 
twisted. No compass or snag that you can use on it. If he is along the road, there is no 
carpenter who looks back at it. Krek those words of yours: big, but without any use. 
Everyone turns their backs on them. " 
Zhuang Zi replied: 'Have you never seen a forest cat or a weasel? They creep low to the 
ground and lie in an ambush, lurking on small animals. Then they take a big leap from here to 
over there, without paying attention to how high they jump, and so they fall into the trap or 
find death in the safety net. Or take for example the aurochs. He is so big that he reaches up 
to the clouds hanging from the sky. He is capable of being big, but certainly not in catching 
rats. And now you have a big tree, but you complain that he has no use. Then why do not you 
plant him in the land of nothing, in the field of the wide wilderness? Then you sit next to it, 
do nothing or sleep freely and happily under it. Because: 
He will not fall prey to the axe! 
Nothing will ever hurt him! 
Who does not serve anything, 










Zhi, Z. (2007). Zhuang Zi de volledige geschriften. Het grote klassieke boek van het taoïsme 
[Zhuang Zi the complete writings. The great classic book of Taoism] (Schipper. 
Translation) (10th ed.). (pp.52-53). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Augustus.  
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Appendix E 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ON DAOIST MORAL ACT  
 
Once upon a time, several years ago, I had the opportunity to engage in a variety of 
teamteaching enterprises at Stanford University. At one time, my colleague Lee Yearley 
sought to impress upon students the differences between the thought of the Confucian thinker 
Mencius and the thought of the Daoist thinker Chuang-tzu. The starting point was Mencius' 
famous insistence that human nature is such that none of us would fail to be moved if we saw 
an infant facing imminent death, such as by falling into an open well; Chuang-tzu, 
meanwhile, presumably believed that humans are incapable of comprehending the true 
meaning of the events that constitute the context of our lives, and urged us to refrain from the 
delusion that we can correctly analyze those events and correctly govern the events that occur 
to us. To stimulate students' ruminations on these issues, Lee Yearley gave our students an 
assignment, to write a paper beginning with the following proposition: Mencius and Chuang-
tzu are sitting together on a riverbank, when an infant was descried floating precariously on 
the river, apparently on its way to its death from drowning. The students' assignment was to 
describe what each man, in that situation, would do, and why. His assumption was that as 
students wrestled with the thought content of each of the thinkers in question, students would 
have to grapple with the morally difficult imperative of Chuang-tzu's thought, which would 
ask us to forego intervention in the processes at work around us, even if such restraint should 
mean that innocent children should perish as a result. This presumed moral dilemma was 
intended to challenge students to wrestle meaningfully with the dilemma of the human 
condition: that is, that humans live with moral imperatives to do what seems to us to be good, 
at the same time that we realize that we cannot fully control the events that take place around 
us, and can probably not fully effect our will, despite our best intentions. Such, at least, was 
the apparent moral quandary into which Lee Yearley worked to lead the students in our class. 
One of my own students, however, quickly answered the assigned question, in an 
unexpectedly easy fashion. The assignment was to explain what Mencius and Chuang-tzu 
each would do, and why, so this student simply explained that Mencius would jump up to 
save the baby, for the obvious reasons, and that Chuang-tzu would do nothing whatsoever, 
because he had no reason to do so: Mencius was already out there saving the baby, so there 





Kirkland, R. (n.d.) "RESPONSIBLE NON-ACTION" IN A NATURAL WORLD : 
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CONSIDERATIONS OF DAOISM IN HUMANIST CHAPLAINCY 
Heidegger’s antimetaphysical thought, his thought on Being and his critique on humanism are 
respected by the Humanistic Canon. Literature on Zen-Buddhism and its spirituality is being 
educated to students of the UvH, but literature on Daoism and Confucianism are not. I think 
that Dutch humanism may possibly bear much more fruits if it was open to study and 
dialogize with Daoism and Confucianism. By this extent, Daoist spiritual practices would be 
placed next to Buddhist spiritual practices such as meditation. This would give humanist 
chaplains more tools and background to work with, concerning spirituality.  
Wu Wei nor the praxis Tai Chi (Chuan) are ascetic ideals. They can be pragmatically 
used to improve medical and mental health, but can also be used as exercise principles to 
practice spiritual harmonization with the Tao. Tai Chi Chuan is a spiritual expression form 
for exercising in wu wei. Through thoughtless meditational movement, Tai Chi is the artistic 
expression of meditation in movement by Tao and Te. In that sense, Tai Chi Chuan would be 
commensurable as a doctrine of movement and spiritual exercise like the more familiar 
sitting Zen-meditation. The research into spirituality in humanist chaplains at Van IJssel 
(2007, p.437) shows that all respondents are familiar with one or more spiritual techniques. 
Two thirds of the group spends time on these techniques on a weekly basis. These are non-
humanistic traditional techniques such as meditation, breathing exercises and yoga-body 
exercises. Van IJssel concludes that this image provides insight into how humanistic 
counselors deal with the shortage of humanistic non-verbal spiritual practices. In that sense, 
Daoism could contribute by describing a philosophy and spirituality with involvement of the 
body and provide a wide range of spiritual and physiological exercises such as Tai Chi Chuan 
and Qi Gong and even by extent Traditional Chinese medicine due to its foundations in 
Daoism and embodied experience.  
For the humanist chaplains interviewed by Van IJssel (2007), spirituality is primarily 
an emotional life and a heart issue. In the Dutch Spiritual Care Directive (2009), spirituality 
is described as 'the philosophical functioning of man, which includes the questions of 
meaning and sense experience'. It seems to concern words like 'meaning, purpose and 
transcendence'. This is an experiential dimension in which self-care of an embodied mind has 
meaning and can be meaningful for humanistic spiritual work. As a result, care for the body 
and mind can be further elaborated, like how Renaissance humanistic ideas and ideals about 
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the homo universalis have meant to be. Man develops in all her possible qualities, including 
in her physicality. Man as a homo universalis can then be understood as the balance between 
vita complentativa and vita activa: a contemplative life and an active life. The work of 
Hannah Arendt (1958) criticizes Western metaphysics, because the act is understood as 
poiesis. According to Arendt, Western metaphysics therefore remains trapped in an 
instrumental way of thinking instead of thinking in an active life. The question is which place 
has 'praxis', physical spirituality or physical self-care within the humanist spiritual care. 'An 
important starting point is that in the East 'the priority and the starting point are not usually in 
the human cognitive capacity, but in a broadly understood' praxis' ([personal interpretation] to 
which meditation belongs), which at the same time transcends the cognitive capacity and 
opens the way to a kind of religion-without-deity (De Martelaere, 2006, p.27). This gives 
humanist chaplains the opportunity to explore eastern spiritual practices without conflicting 
in philosophies.  
Taoist spirituality is closely interwoven with the inseparability of body and mind in 
the most commonly known traditional Chinese medicine, Qi Gong and Tai Chi Chuan. In the 
Eastern way of thinking, the body and the mind are used to acquire free and new insights or 
to manipulate the body and mind in such a way through a connecting, for example respiratory 
meditation, and / or re-creating contact strategy with the body, for example in the praxis of 
Tai Chi Chuan and aikido, gaining a detachment from discomfort from a certain (life) attitude 
and to pay attention to what happens in the body (Van IJssel, 2007, p.155). In Taoism and 
Chinese thinking there is no separation between body and mind because they constantly work 
together. The body, the mind and all other matter are made up of Qi, which Maciocia (1989) 
sees rather as a "continuous form of matter" than an energy. According to Maciocia (2005, 
p.41), Qi (氣) is a matter that simultaneously manifests itself at the physical and mental-
spiritual levels. The purpose of Daoist meditation is to reach the inner chamber in our minds 
where the jing (essence) resides. By breathing qi in and out and with the meditation practices, 
the inner chamber can be enlarged so that more vitality can be maintained. The body and 
mind are therefore not seen in Chinese philosophy and medicine as a complex mechanism, 
but as different manifestations of Qi that together form an organism. Cultivating this Qi and 
being one with the Tao are therefore the most important spiritual understandings in traditional 
Chinese medicine. Systematic reviews (Wayne et al, 2013) have endorsed the importance of 
spirituality as a positive factor in coping with disease, preventing diseases and helping to 
speed up treatments. Tai Chi has an intimate self-awareness and demands delay. A delay so 
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slow that it has time to be aware of feelings and sensations. One of Wayne's students said: "I 
do not practice it every day, but when I do, I find that it keeps me honest in my life and it 
provides a 'knowing' that just cannot think." (2013, p.64). Tai Chi is a self-examination that 
transcends matter, logic and has a spiritual dimension. Finally, Tai Chi can help to make the 
connection between spirituality and the larger Universe. For example, the Daoist technique of 
deep breathing leads to an exchange of energy with nature. By Being with nature through the 
exercise of meditative deep breathing, the life energy Qi is being absorbed by the body. Tai 
Chi Chuan is also designed to feel a sense of orientation and connection with the Earth. It 
offers the unity of unity to connect one's own essence or spirit with something that is part of a 
larger whole." (ibid, p.64). Tai Chi is translated as the Ultimate that refers to Yin and Yang, a 
cosmic complementary duality that is central to Taoism. Chuan is translated as fist or boxing. 
Thus, it is a movement art with meditative properties, aimed at relaxation, health and self-
defense (Wayne & Fuerst, 2013). In the sense of ziran (natural being so, or spontaneity), Tai 
Chi Chuan aims at practicing and cultivating the awareness, openness and responsiveness to 
the act of wu wei and being ziran. Relaxation and health improvement are visualizations of 
the Tao. Cultivating self-defense is nourishing the ability to intervene but is also the artistic 
expression of the self while the individual meditates in movement. This praxis, a series of 
movement exercises in which the Qi is directed by the mind, arises from a holistic view of 
man. It emphasizes Daoist principles of wu wei and ziran and has a one leg in the philosophy 
of Daoism and the other leg in traditional Chinese medicine (De Martelaere, 2006). Not long 
ago the classical Daoist text Nei Ye (Inner Training) was found and translated. It is a Daoist 
text on inner cultivation and meditation techniques that are older than the two texts of Lao Zi 
and Zhuang Zi. These two texts make references to inner cultivation practices and meditation 
techniques, which until now have been dismissed by scholars as 'metaphors' or relics from a 
shamanistic past (De Martelaere, 2006, p.22. Schipper, 2007 & 2010), because there were no 
historical references and sources. These cultivation practices, breathing and meditation 
techniques – of the Nei Ye - helps expand the inner space in the mind in us to gather more life 
energy (Qi). Through the translation of the Nei Ye De Martelaere suspects that there is a 
direct connection between "an 'Inner Training' and a general 'medicine' of the body" (ibid, 
p.22). That would lead to a constructive and coherent philosophy of the body. If so, it would 
allow for a non-dualism between materialism and idealism as it has been in European 
philosophy:  
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Both [the doctrine of the macro and microcosm and organic naturalism] were the 
subject of what I call ... the characteristic European schizophrenia or split personality. 
Europeans could only think in terms of either the mechanical materialism of 
Democrites or the theological spiritualism of Plato. There always had to be a deus for 
a machina [spirit in the machine]. Animas, entelechiae, souls and archaei dance in a 
procession through the history of European thought. (Needham in Maciocia, 1989, 
p.42) 
In search of the source of individual and collective life, Irigaray struggles with deconstructive 
thinking. There are plenty of questions that the deconstructor cannot solve and therefore 
Irigaray starts with the basic principle of natural and spiritual life, namely breathing 
independently (2009, p.40). To her, it is an attempt to live autonomously and to be 
independent of being breathed. With Oriental masters she has not attempted to put their 
knowledge into the metaphysical mold of Western thought. As a result, she suspects that the 
transfer of Eastern knowledge has taken place on her. From this, Irigaray learned that the 
body itself can become spiritual by practicing breathing. The soul and breathing were still 
connected in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but not anymore nowadays. What takes place 
for the soul is "the result of conceptualizations and representations and not the result of a 
practice of breathing." (2009, p.42). We trace this back to Eckhart about Gelassenheit and 
receptiveness. If the person with a technical goal starts practicing the practice of breathing, 
then that is in any case no inner cultivation. In the Chinese mind, body and mind are 
continuously a unity. Breathing with a goal defeats the resignation so that the inner space 
cannot unfold. With a poetic language, Irigaray explains:  
That consciousness is an increasing awakening of the whole being by leading the 
breath of the centers of elemental vitality to the more spiritual centers: those of the 
heart, of speaking and of thinking. [...] Spiritual development is not separate from the 
body, nor from the desire, but the body and the desire are gradually trained to forsake 
what harms both. It is certainly not about renouncing for renouncing, but about 
renouncing what is standing in the way of access to bliss here on earth. So asceticism 
is not negative, as has often been the case in the West. She is a wanted and accepted 





PROFESSOR SIROJ SORAJJAKOOL ON WU WEI IN PASTORAL CARE  
In the book Wu Wei, Negativity, and Depression: The Principle of Non-Trying in the Practice 
of Pastoral Care, Professor Siroj Sorajjakool writes about the added value of wu wei in 
pastoral care of depressed individuals. Sorajjakool assumed position that the concept of wu 
wei does not conflict in theological sense. The principle of wu wei, together with the theory of 
self-regulating conservation can help to understand the cycle mechanism of depression in 
individuals. In addition, the application of wu wei can help to reduce the forces of negativity 
and break depressed individuals out of the cycle of depression. With his research, Sorajjakool 
tried to offer a new coping skill with which pastoral caretakers can help people with 
depression. His study indicates that depression is an attempt by the psyche to direct the ego to 
unity and spirituality. Sorajjakool (2001, p.7) sees wu wei as a possible principle to be used 
with other counseling techniques, psychotherapy and other psychotropic medication by 
empowering the individuals with the possibility of reaching a different self-worth and so 
releasing the normative frames the individual is entrapped in.  
In the book The Pastoral Care of Depression: A Guidebook pastoral nurse Binford W. 
Gilbert presents three pastoral functions (in Sorajjakool, 2001, p.43). First, the pastor must 
attempt to change victimhood. Through Biblical readings, depressed individuals need to 
know that they still have control over their lives and that God stands by them. Second, the 
pastor must encourage depressed individuals who isolate and withdraw to take risks as Jesus 
did with their disciples and thirdly, support them through logotherapy. Logotherapy was 
developed by psychiatrist-neurologist Viktor Frankl, which focuses on finding meaning as 
primary motivation. Pastors can use their training in theological reflection to develop 
meaning as a source for individuals who experience senselessness in life. Sorajjakool 
believes that these three functions ensure that individuals evaluate themselves better and 
encourage self-regulation. If self-regulation is able to close the gap between the "is" and the 
"ought" during a self-evaluation, the problem becomes less serious. If the "ought" is 
redefined on the experience of negativity, then this approach is very helpful, says Sorajjakool 
(2001). 
Sorajjakool (2001, p.113) assumes that the principle of wu wei helps to remove the 
focus on the self. As a result, the stalemate between the 'you are' and 'you should be' lapses. 
Without the focus on the objectified self 'I should be' (ought), the 'I am now' can be 
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confirmed. This creates the possibility for an alternative source of value. Wu Wei invites that 
individual to accept the 'nonbeing' left and thus to rest in himself. By embracing the 
'negativity' as Sorajjakool calls it, emptying that emptiness resolves the negativity. He sees 
five possibilities for pastoral caretakers with this Wu Wei approach (ibid, p.113-126): 1. 
name the cultural and theological context that pursuit 'being'. This context demands 'being' at 
the expense of 'nonbeing'. By shifting to 'nonbeing' the context and the input for stress falls 
away; 2. walking with depressed individuals in the experience of negativity without judgment 
or attempt to solve their depression. The attempt is to help them find peace in their 
experience; 3. By learning wu wei as trusting God or the process of nature; 4. widening the 
meaning of what is normative; 5. wu wei can be used one-on-one to explore their issues in 
greater depth.  
Wu Wei wonders what it means to be a ‘healthy self’, something Sorajjakool says with 
culture, theological and philosophical presuppositions. According to Zhuang Zi, self-
affirmation is sought through the process of self-evaluation. By considering what, "ought to 
be", the reflexive self starts to correct itself, which then leads to a reduced affirmation. Wu 
Wei's strongest point is therefore perhaps his emphasis on spirituality. In the language of 
Sorajjakool, spirituality refers to the need for meaning in the confrontation with nonbeing. 
For him, spirituality means 'the art of giving meaning at an existential level' (2001, p.123). 
The experience of negativity is often expressed by "negative memory bias, negative self-
perception, self-blame and self-negation." (Sorajjakool, 2001, p.116). Through this 
experience, depressive individuals try to affirm themselves by over-analyzing themselves. 
They can even try to force themselves to feel a certain feeling. In the whole process, they 
objectify themselves and try to confirm themselves in their language-technological 'utility' 
from which they derive their self-esteem. As a result, they always get rid of themselves, 
because they try to focus on what they 'must' feel and not feel they are feeling 'now'. The wu 
wei approach does not encourage to change thinking or behavior, but to be left in that 
uncomfortable situation. The individual separates from being and willing through theological 
and philosophical constructs. The point is that there is no intervention goal for the self, so that 
the attention for the self is shifted to a new normative framework in which it can be based. 
 
